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Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been widely adopted by both profit 
making and non- profit making organisations around the world in the 21
st
 century, in order to 
exploit the envisaged benefits that are associated with ICTs.  These benefits include improved 
productivity, better efficiency, cost reductions, better quality of services and products, timely 
delivery of services, increased profits and many others. As a result governments in developed 
and developing nations around the world have also invested in ICT in order to improve service 
delivery to their citizens and clients, among other reasons. With time ICTs have improved and 
expanded to offer better services, such as increased bandwidth and more affordable Internet 
connectivity. Therefore, this has resulted in an attractive environment for cybercrime. 
Unfortunately for most developing countries especially in Africa, this is a serious challenge since 
they currently lack necessary controls and effective cybercrime legislation to secure their 
infrastructure.  
 
Different authors have reported on the problem of cybercrime and other concepts that are 
associated with it. The studies looking at the area of ICT and cybercrime are examined and 
assessed to identify gaps that exist. Nevertheless, most of these studies focused more on 
developed countries, and did not emphasise on the public sector. Therefore, their findings might 
not be appropriately applicable to governments in developing countries especially within the 
Africa context.  
 
This study seeks to investigate factors that are necessary to enable the Botswana public sector to 
properly report on cybercrime attacks. The ICT environment of Botswana government is 
explored to determine the extent of ICT utilisation in the public sector. Based on the literature 
survey, a research framework for reporting cybercrime for the Botswana public sector is 
formulated.   
 
To carry out the study the research adopted a quantitate approach with a positivistic viewpoint. It 
used a hardcopy paper questionnaire that was administered to Botswana public employees who 
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order to provide empirical validation for the research framework with the Botswana public 
sector.   
 
Findings for this research showed that Cybercrime Awareness, User Training on Information 
Security Awareness, and Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation significantly impact on the 
ability of users to report on cybercrime attacks within the Botswana public sector. Furthermore, 
it was established that Organisational Culture and User Training on Cybercrime Awareness have 
a significant impact on Cybercrime Awareness within the Botswana public sector.  
 
The study also outlines the nature of significance of these results to the academic world and also 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Background and Context  
 
The government of Botswana has embraced the use of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) which is now wide spread in its different departments and public 
institutions around the country (Republic of Botswana, 2010).  This move was precipitated by 
the presumed benefits such as cost efficiency, productivity, and better service delivery to the 
public which are being realised by the private sector which adopted the technology before 
government did (Kyobe, 2010; Moloi & Mutula, 2007). Furthermore other countries both in 
Africa and overseas also use ICT to deliver their services (Longe, Ngwa, Wada, Mbarika, & 
Kvasny, 2009; Morawczynski & Ngwenyama, 2007).  
 
The increase in ICT adoption has resulted in problems such as cybercrime to also be realised 
in Botswana and other parts of Africa due to the fact that there are less or no controls to 
secure the infrastructure, leaving criminals to act as they please (Longe et al., 2009; Ochieng, 
2011). This situation is further worsened by the f ct that Botswana, like South Africa 
(Nyanda, 2010) does not yet have clear guidelines to help with the implementation of the new 
Cybercrime and Computer related Crime Act which was introduced in 2007 (Ngakaagae, 
2010). Due to the above limitation the government or public sector may at times not even be 
aware of cybercrime attacks experienced, which make it hard to report or account for them at 
all.  
 
1.2 Research Purpose  
 
The main aim of this research is to investigate factors that hinder Botswana public sector 
organisations from recognising and reporting properly on cybercrime attacks.  
 
The purpose of this research is to develop a framework that will enable the public sector in 
Botswana to recognise and report on cybercrime attacks. To achieve this, the research will 
investigate and identify factors that impact the public sector in Botswana to recognise and 
report on cybercrime attacks. Eventually an effective tool (framework) will be delivered that 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
 
This research has the follows objectives which it aims to achieve: 
 
1. To conduct a literature review on the issue of cybercrime and identify factors that 
impact the ability to report cybercrime attacks within an organisation. 
2. To develop a research framework from literature that can enable the Botswana public 
sector to report cybercrime attacks.  
3. To empirically validate the research framework within the context of the Botswana 
public sector using questionnaires. 
4. To identify future research areas in relation to this study. 
  
1.4 Research Scope 
 
The focus of this study is to determine factors that impact on the ability to report cybercrime 
attacks in an organisation. Such knowledge could be used to educate ICT users on how to 
report incidents or attacks of cybercrime if they occur within an organisation. This covers 
general knowledge and concepts of cybercrime both in developed and developing countries, 
including Africa.  
 
This research does not focus on a specific government department or ministry, but rather it 
aims to assess the overall atmosphere within the Botswana public sector as far as cybercrime 
is concerned. However, a deliberate decision was made to include certain units that are of 
interest to this study, namely: the Information Technology (IT) unit, Human Resources (HR) 
unit, heads of units or departments and senior management because of specific reasons that 
will be elaborated more in sections to follow. In general the study aims to include as many 
users of ICT from different government ministries as much as possible in order to build a 
sample that is representative of the Botswana government.   
 
1.5 Research Value  
 
The importance of this study is in twofold, both theoretically and practically. It will 
contribute to the field of Information Systems by providing insight into the developing world 
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which there is currently limited literature. The work that has been done by academics on 
cybercrime on this sector mostly addresses the developed countries where ICTs have been in 
existence for a considerable number of years compared to Africa. Furthermore, there is a 
limitation in studies that investigate factors within the public sector that affect the 
management of cybercrime.  
 
On a practical level the study will provide a framework that the Botswana government and 
maybe other similar African countries can use to raise the level of awareness for cybercrime 
and also reporting of incidents within the public sector. This will be very helpful given the 
fact that the Botswana government has started to implements its e-government initiative that 
when fully implemented will result in more information being available digitally, and most 
government services offered on-line to the public. Therefore, the framework developed by 
this study could be used to raise the level of awareness among employees within the public 
sector to enable them to better identify and report cybercrime attacks.  
 
This study can also provide an opportunity for the Botswana government to develop clear 
guidelines on how to fight cybercrime and implement the Cybercrime and Computer Related 
Crimes Act of 2007, which most people do not yet understand or know since it has no clear 
guidelines (Ngakaagae, 2010). Such guidelines would also enable the law enforcement and 
legal departments within the government to manage cybercrime offenses better as stipulated 
by the Act. Finally, results from this study can be used to facilitate further studies for research 
in sectors other than the public sector to analyse whether the research framework applies to 
them or even to other African countries.  
 
1.6 Dissertation Overview 
 
The dissertation is presented in various chapters that have been broken down as follows: in 
the abstract, the summary of the purpose and scope of research, the chosen methodology as 
well as key findings and the conclusion are given.  
 
Chapter 1: gives the introduction followed by the research background, the research purpose 
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Chapter 2: presents the literature review on the area of cybercrime and other related concepts 
to provide an understanding for the research area. This information is used to later formulate 
the research framework that was tested imperially for this study. This chapter ends by 
presenting identified gaps in the literature in order to motivate this study.  
 
Chapter 3: contains the research framework to be used in this study. It also provides a 
thorough explanation to the research model, research questions and refined objectives. The 
research hypotheses used to test the framework are also provided. 
 
Chapter 4: presents the research methodology used in the study. Areas that are covered 
include underlying philosophy, sample plan; methods used for data collection, techniques for 
data analysis, the research framework and relevant ethical considerations. Also the research 
design instruments are explained. 
 
Chapter 5: gives all the descriptive analyses results obtained from the sample data. This 
includes descriptions for respondent profiles, questionnaire items and constructs. 
 
Chapter 6: contains the different tests conducted during analysis for instrument validity and 
reliability. 
 
Chapter 7: presents results obtained from hypotheses testing with the corresponding analysis 
and evaluations. Implications for findings are also given. The research summary findings and 
refined research framework are also provided. Lastly, the additional findings are discussed. 
 
Chapter 8: is a conclusion for the dissertation; reviewing concepts presented in other 
sections. Then implications for the study findings are also given for academics and 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter provides findings obtained from other studies that analysed concepts and 
findings from cybercrime and related ICT issues.  
 
2.1 What is Cybercrime? 
The term cybercrime has been used by academics, IT professionals, business people and 
general computer users. Despite this, it does not have an agreed definition but is defined in 
various ways (Fafinski, 2007; Kshetri, 2010). There is also no statute or legal definition of 
cybercrime (Arpana & Chauhan, 2012). Nagpal (2008) defines it as any unlawful act where 
the computer is used as a tool, target or both. He goes on to say a computer can be any device 
such as a laptop, desktop, cell phone, smart watch or PDA (Personal Data Assistant). It is also 
referred to as any crime that involves a computer and a network, where a computer can be the 
target of the crime such as Denial of Service (DoS), virus and malware infections; the 
computer in other instances can also be used to commit a crime such as cyber stalking, fraud, 
identity theft, hacking and copyright infringements (Cardoso, 2007).  
 
There is also another dimension of this crime where the computer is used as an accessory to 
hold stolen data or information (Sukhai, 2004). The Council of Europe convention uses the 
word to include offenses committed against data, its contents and copyright breaches 
(Archick, 2004). It is also considered to be fraud, forgery and unauthorised access (United 
Nations, 1995).   
 
 Cybercrimes can be classified into two classes: the first being crimes that involve a computer 
network attacking other networks, such as when malicious code or viruses are used to disable 
computer systems. The second one is where computer networks are used to attack targeted 
users; examples include fraud, copyright infringement, identity theft, intrusion and others that 
target individuals or organisations (Arpana & Chauhan, 2012).  
 
This lack of an agreed definition leads to an unclear understanding of what cybercrime really 
is, and how to prevent and manage it (Fafinski, 2007; Gordon & Ford, 2006). This situation 
results in confusion for users to know what it or how to identify when such a crime has 
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For this study the following definition shall be adopted as: “any crime that is facilitated or 
committed using a computer, network, or hardware device; the computer or device may be 
the agent of the crime, the facilitator of the crime, or the target of the crime” (Gordon & Ford, 
2006, 14). This definition tries to be more encompassing and avoids limiting cybercrime to 
cover only illegal activities that individuals carry out while online (Rho, 2007). 
 
2.2 History of Cybercrime 
This section looks at the history of cybercrime to get an insight of how it evolved with time to 
be what it is today. This might shed light on some obscure issues regarding the crime.  
 
Cybercrime started around the period of 1979 – 1983 with young boys (from USA, Europe, 
Australia and Canada) playing with home computers (based on DOS (Disk Operating 
System) and accessing the BBS (Bulletin Board System) to learn how to connect to the X.25 
public data network system in order to find any open  networks to connect to and satisfy their 
curiosity.  Then from around 1986 – 1990s the upcoming underground hacking world 
developed their own magazines called ‘2600’ and Hacker’s Quarterly; through which they 
could share their skills and ideas. This enabled hackers in different countries to collaborate 
and hack as a group and then share their findings on the BBS. During this period the USA 
(United States of America) military and government computer systems were targeted; this 
was done for gaining recognition and enhancing skills (Chiesa, 2010).  
 
During the period 1995 – 2000, when the Internet was introduced in a number of countries, 
the school hackers learnt how to use the X.25 public data network system to connect to the 
Internet and then explored their skills to hack into universities, government, and military 
systems in order to ‘show off’ to their friends. With the aid of the Internet the hackers started 
writing and distributing exploits or attack codes easily, and in 2000 Michael Calce retrieved 
DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) codes from the internet which he later used to stop 
services on eBay, Amazon and Yahoo websites. This ushered in the new threat of what these 
inexperienced hackers could do to online businesses globally (Think Quest, 2011). At this 
point the organised crime groups like the Mafias in Europe realised the opportunity to make 
money through these exploits, and started hiring these programmers (coders) around the 
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From the period 2001 – 2005 cybercrime officially became established with the introduction 
of well organised and planned attacks with financial motives. This was augmented by the fact 
that hackers and Mafia criminals collaborated together which resulted in easy availability of 
highly sophisticated malicious software and infrastructure and also that there was now a 
global proliferation of fast Internet connections which also introduced new services like e-
commerce (electronic commerce). This made it easy for cybercrime to become global in 
nature (Think Quest, 2011). 
 
From the years 2005 to date, cybercrime took a different turn with new players entering the 
scene to harness the power of the Internet to launch attacks that were not possible before. 
These included foreign governments and their militaries. The Chinese military in 2007 
hacked into the US Defence Department’s email system and took it down for over a week, 
however China denied the allegations. During the same year of 2007 the Israeli air defence is 
reported to have disabled the Syrian military air defence radar detection system for warplanes 
by taking advantage of an undisclosed “disable switch” found on the radar computer system’s 
chip. This enabled the Israeli army jets to bomb a site suspected to be a nuclear reactor in 
Syria (Businessweek, 2012). 
 
Still yet in 2007, businesses, churches, governments and NGOs became victims to the Zeus 
botnet where their networks were compromised. The attack was initiated through phishing 
techniques using an email to attract users to click on a link which installed malicious software 
on computers which would capture keystrokes to steal banking details. Investigations showed 
that about US$70 million was lost through Zeus and around 100 perpetrators worldwide were 
arrested. In 2008 during the US presidential elections, an attack on both Mr Obama and Mr 
McCain’s computer network was reported by the FBI; this originated from a foreign 
government which was later identified as China. The purpose of the attack was to gather 
information regarding the two candidate’s policy plans (Businessweek, 2012). 
 
With the entrance of foreign governments in the cybercrime scene, the nature and purpose of 
attacks has been changed drastically. In January 2010 Google reported that it discovered a 
very sophisticated attack on its Gmail network for accounts of activists for human rights; the 
attacks originated from China. These attacks prompted Google to consider withdrawing its 
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discovered in June. This worm targeted industrial computers systems installed with Siemens 
software that were also used in Iran where the worm was reported to have been highly 
detected. This lead to researchers speculating the possibility of the worm’s origins to be 
either from the United States or Israel which was meant to sabotage Iran’s nuclear ambitions 
(Businessweek, 2012). 
 
The evolution of cybercrime which was characterised with underground activities made it 
difficult for people to understand what its true nature was; hence this resulted in little 
information being available in the public domain which accounted for why there was no clear 
agreement of what it was or how to manage it (Gordon & Ford, 2006).  
 
2.3 Cybercrime Reporting 
A continued rise in criminals’ use of ICT to commit crime has been noticed over the past few 
years (Rustad, 2001); on the other hand challenges with cybercrime legislation, limitation for 
resources and skills by law enforcement agencies makes it hard for most crimes to be 
successfully addressed (Akuta et al, 2011). This has resulted in individuals and a number of 
organisations to fall victims to such crimes. Therefore to address this problem, organisations 
need to develop and or improve on their cybercrime reporting policies and strategies in order 
to address this situation (Computer Security Institute, 2011). 
 
The following reasons have been pointed out in support of why cybercrime needs to be 
addressed: 
 To develop initiatives that will reduce the cybercrime 
 To enhance response from other stakeholders both locally and internationally 
 To identify limitations within existing responses 
 To aid in decision making and assessment of risks 
 To develop cybercrime prevention measures 
 To enable better cybercrime reporting 
 To help in public education and awareness 
(Fafinski, Dutton & Margetts, 2010). 
 
Cybercrime reporting is already being addressed by organisations both in government and 
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these is that there are a lot of organisations that are involved in the collection of cybercrime 
activities within different countries. Furthermore, these organisations and countries do not 
collaborate to share and consolidate their records. These organisations include the police, 
private companies, academic institutions, other government agencies and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs). This results in challenges for mapping the real extent of cybercrime 
(Fafinski et al., 2010). 
 
Reporting challenges are also worsened by the fact that records which are held by the police 
are generally under-reported or even under-recorded in some instances due to a number of 
reasons. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) in 2001 established an agency, the National 
High-Tech Crime Unit (NHCTU) to handle cybercrime matters both nationally and across the 
border. This agency received substantial reports both from the public and business areas 
because it had a confidential clause to protect the reporters (Valerie et al., 2006).   
 
However, a few years later, in order to consolidate reporting functions in UK, operations of 
three separate agencies were merged together; among them was NHCTU, to form the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) cybercrime reporting. SOCA removed the confidentiality 
clause for reporting by NHCTU; this move has been feared could result in few incidents 
being reported compared to before (Bennett, 2006).  
 
Following the 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA, the federal government initiated a thorough 
review of its internet security policies. This resulted in the assignment of cyber national 
security to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003. A separate division called 
United States Computer Readiness Response Team (US-CERT) was created within DHS 
with sole responsibility of securing the federal government network from any eventual attack 
(US-CERT, 2011).   
 
To achieve this objective, DHS was tasked to develop emergency plans that would be used to 
warn and direct the network users in an event of a threat. The work of US-CERT is limited to 
government network users only since it had been realised that these users were not covered 
by already existing structures within the private sector that prevent cyber-attacks. The job of 
US-CERT is to provide current information about security risks and exploits through the 
government alert system, and then ensure that solutions are available to address the issues 
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Within the private sector, it has been identified that 97% of severe cybercrime incidents go 
unreported in order to avoid negative publicity to businesses. Therefore most businesses care 
more about protecting their reputation; hence this results in under-reporting (BERR, 2008). 
This trend has also been reported to be similar in the USA (Campbell et al., 2003; 
Richardson, 2007). 
 
Walls (2007) further notes that organisations do not see the need to report cybercrime 
incidents to the police because they lack the necessary expertise to handle information 
security issues. This results in very few cases being taken to the police (nearly 7%), while 
most victims end up seeking help from professional security experts (39%) as reported in the 
UK (Fafinski et al., 2010). 
 
The problem of under-reporting has also been noticed among individuals. This was revealed 
in a survey in UK in which it emerged that for Internet security breaches at household level, 
only 13% ever reported the incidents; 27% indicated they would report to their Internet 
Service Providers (ISP) and not to the police. This trend was found to be similar even for 
virus infection incidents from a British study conducted in 2004. In the case of individuals, 
under-reporting for cybercrime has also been attributed to fear of embarrassment and 
victimisation especially where there are monitory loss involved (Wilson et al., 2006). 
 
Wall (2007) advices that in order for cybercrime reports to have an impact they should be 
aggregated to avoid being treated as isolated cases; this would allow the police and other 
agencies to form links between the incidents and identify any underlying trends. Aggregation 
of reported cybercrime incidents can also be used to reveal severe impacts of some attacks 
such as denial of service (DoS) attacks which cannot be picked from isolated reports. 
Therefore, this makes it easier and cheaper to respond to these incidents than attending to 
them in isolation (Fafinski et al., 2010). 
 
Some of the cybercrime reports are produced by private companies who happen to be 
involved in the information security industry; hence they have vested interest on the impact 
of their reports. Therefore their findings should be interpreted with care since they might be 
tempted to exaggerate the state of cybercrime in the quest to promote their products or 
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2.3.1 Cybercrime Statistics  
This section will provide statistics of cybercrime that have been reported by different 
organisations, mostly for the developed countries. These statistics are meant to give 
indication of the extent that this crime is affecting the information society.  
 
Table 1 shows the rate at which criminals are sending targeted email attacks to organisations 
in specific sectors or industry. This report was adopted from Symantec’s Internet Security 
Report. The government or public sector was reported as the highest targeted sector at 25%, 
followed by manufacturing at 15% and finance at 14% (Symantec Corporation, 2012). 
 
Sector Rate of Targeted Email Attacks 
Retail 3% 
Education 3% 
Marketing and Media 3% 
Non-Profit 4% 
Transport and Utilities 6% 
Chemical Pharmaceutical 6% 
IT Services 6% 
Finance 14% 
Manufacturing 15% 
Government and Public Sector 25% 
Table 1: Top 10 Targeted Email Attacks by Sector for 2011 (Symantec Corporation, 2012) 
 
On the other hand, Table 2 below shows the rate of data breach experienced by organisations 
in specific sectors or industry. In this category the health care sector received the highest rate 
of breach with 43%, followed by government or public sector at 14%, education at 13% and 
finance at 8% (Symantec Corporation, 2012). 
 
Sector Rate of Data Breach 
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Computer Software 5% 
Arts and Media 5% 
Financial 8% 
Education 13% 
Government and Public Sector 14% 
Health Care 43% 
Table 2: Top 10 Data Breaches by Sector for 2011 (Symantec Corporation, 2012) 
 
Another issue that has been reported to be of much concern to most network administrator is 
the amount of bandwidth that is consumed by email servers to download spam emails that are 
flooding user’s email accounts. The amount of spam emails was reported to have dropped in 
2011 compared to what has experienced in 2010. Figure 1 below shows that in 2011 spam 
accounted for an average 68% of all emails that were received by organisations around the 
world (Symantec Corporation, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 1: Rate of Spam Email for 2011 (Symantec Corporation, 2012) 
 
Table 3 shows the types of cybercrime attacks that organisations in the USA have been 
experiencing from the years 2007 to 2010 as reported by the Computer Security Institute 
(CSI) Survey report for Computer Crime and Security report of 2011. This report indicates 
that most attacks have been reported to be dropping in percentage each consecutive year 
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respondents are mostly companies that actively employ security tools to protect their network 
(Computer Security Institute, 2011). 
 
Type of Attack  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Malware infection 52% 50% 64% 67% 
Bots / Zombies within organisation 21% 20% 23% 29% 
Fraudulently represented as sender of phishing message 26% 31% 34% 39% 
Password Sniffing 10% 9% 17% 12% 
Financial Fraud 12% 12% 20% 9% 
Denial of Service 25% 21% 29% 17% 
Website Defacement 10% 6% 14% 7% 
Exploit of social network profile n/a n/a 7% 5% 
Internet access / email abuse by insiders 59% 44% 30% 25% 
Unauthorised access by insiders n/a n/a 15% 13% 
System breach by outsiders n/a n/a 14% 11% 
Laptop / portable hardware theft or loss 50 42% 42% 34% 
Intellectual property theft / unauthorised access n/a 5% 8% 5% 
Table 3: Experienced Attacks by Percentage (Computer Security Institute, 2011) 
 
Tables 4 and 5 below, show the statistics that have been reported to the Japanese Police 
Service in 2003 regarding cybercrime since 2000 to 2002. In Table 4, the number of incidents 
reported to the police is presented. This shows that incidents have been increasing with each 
year from total complaints from 11,135 (2000) to 19,329 (2002); this reveals a significant 
increase in cybercrime. Table 5 also shows that the number of arrests that were made in 
connection to cybercrime in Japan also increased within the three years. In 2000 there were 
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Table 4: Number of Cybercrime Complaints in Japan (Natsui, 2003) 
 
 
Table 5: Number of Cybercrime related Arrests in Japan (Natsui, 2003) 
 
2.4 Economic Factors of Cybercrime 
Since cybercrime has been shown to be a persistent problem globally, this section will look at 
the economic factors that contribute to the high rise of this crime. 
 
2.4.1 Drivers of Cybercrime 
Information security concerns over the years have transformed from just hacking for ‘the fun 
of it’ by mostly teenagers to an active wealth generating underworld business; where the 
incentives are to make money (security-faq, 2011). Cybercrime is reported to surpass drug 
trafficking by the amount of money that is generated (Silicon Republic, 2009; Symantec 
Report, 2012). One reason why this is such a lucrative market is that perpetrators do not 
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because they have mastered how to conceal their digital tracks which makes it hard for 
enough evidence to be brought against them (Guerra, 2009).  
 
2.4.1.1 Increase in Internet Access for Africa 
The proliferation of fast Internet connections throughout most parts of the world which also 
connects African countries further presents an opportunity to commit cybercrime in any 
country (Cambini & Jiang, 2009; Grobler & van Vuuren, 2010). This situation also makes it 
hard for prosecution since most countries do not yet have extradition agreements for this kind 
of crime as shown by the failure of some cases in Botswana and other countries (Ngakaagae, 
2010; Sosa, n.d).  
 
The growth in Internet connections for Africa is shown in Figure 2 and 3 below. African 
countries have made significant investments since 2008 in a number of projects that were 
meant to increase Internet access and the bandwidth available for data communication 
(Cambini & Jiang, 2009; Grobler & van Vuuren, 2010). Figure 2 shows how Africa was 
initially expected to be connected to the international community by 2010 through undersea 
fibre cable like the Seacom (SEA Cable System). It is evident that this connection was 
limited to only a few countries. Figure 3 on the other hand shows how the outlook of 
undersea cables for Africa in 2011 was predicted to be; this followed the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2008 by Telcome-Orange (France) for installing a 
cable in the cost line of Western Africa to service over 20 countries, from Gabon to France 
(Cottrell & Kalim, 2009). 
 
There has been an increase in Internet connectivity in general in Africa (Manda, 2011).  
Even though the Internet brings about a lot of benefits, it also carries notable security issues, 
especially given that most users lack sufficient skills for cyber security and the increasing 
problem of cyber attacks result in heavy losses for developing countries (OECD, 2005). 
 
Therefore, this increase in ICT and Internet connection will eventually expose government 
departments and corporations to increased cybercrime attacks (Arpana & Chauhan, 2012; 
Grobler & van Vuuren, 2010). This will further be worsened by the fact that when there is a 
high dependence on ICT and the Internet, it has been reported that cybercrime becomes much 
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period of time due to high speed connections (Cassim, 2009), hence there is now high interest 
to stop or prevent this crime (Arpana & Chauhan, 2012). 
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Figure 3: Resultant Undersea Cable for Africa (Cottrell & Kalim, 2009) 
2.4.1.2 Technical and Intensive Skills 
Cybercrime has unique factors that make it different from conventional crime. First of all, it 
requires technology and needs intensive skills; it is global in nature and can reach multiple 
targets; it is also a relatively new form of crime as compared to other crimes. These factors 
make cybercrime difficult and costly to manage, but on the other hand this makes it more 
attractive to perpetrators (Kshetri, 2006).  
 
For someone to commit cybercrime some technical skills are required, even if the person uses 
readily available tools to do so; they would still need to possess more skills compared to other 
criminals that carry out other conventional crimes (Kshetri, 2006). Furthermore, tools needed 
to commit cybercrime are easily available and can be purchased at affordable prices or even 
downloaded for free; this makes cybercrime more attractive to commit (Hirschauer & 
Musshoff, 2007). This situation makes it difficult for the law enforcement to fight cybercrime 
since only very few of them have cyber forensics skills (Akuta et al, 2011) and new trends of 
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The sophistication of cybercrime makes it difficult for law enforcement to investigate, due to 
limitation in resources and expertise. Therefore this results in developing countries not being 
able to investigate all reports of cybercrime (Kshetri, 2006). For instance it was found that in 
Indonesia only 15% of reported cybercrime is investigated, which is further complicated by 
the global nature of the crime, since through ICT cybercrime is not bound to national borders; 
different regulations in countries also make it hard to fight this crime. A recent announcement 
by Interpol (International Police) that only cases of values above 6000 Euros will be 
investigated (Madiya, 2012) makes it difficult to fight cybercrime across countries. Countries 
such as China and Russia which are among key fraud generators have been reported to ignore 
calls to cooperate with cybercrime investigations unless if the committed crimes also impact 
negatively on their countries (Rosenau, 1995). 
 
Therefore the above factors results in a few cases being investigated successfully by law 
enforcement, which further results in fewer cases being reported by victims since they know 
that there is little chances for them being successfully investigated. This then creates what 
Kshetri (2006) terms the vicious circle of cybercrime, which reinforces assurance to criminals 
that they will not be easily prosecuted which leads to poor reporting by cybercrime victims. 
Therefore, cybercrime becomes very attractive to perpetrators and this drives it to go on 
uncontrollably.   
 
2.4.2 Cybercrime Incentives Analysis 
From an organisational perspective, it is believed that cybercrime is driven by the fact that 
there are misaligned incentives between people who are supposed to protect the systems from 
breaches since they do not see any immediate need for them to do so. On the other hand due 
to lack of understanding of cybercrime, management might not have any incentive to allocate 
money that is needed to secure the system as they do not think they would be directly 
affected by the breach (Anderson & More, 2006). This results in management of cybercrime 
not receiving the deserved attention which would facilitate coming up with relevant measures 
and mechanisms that could best protect the information assets of organisations. Hence 
identifying and reporting it becomes a secondary issue and at most times is never done at all. 
In order to avoid such situations, certain laws and standards have been setup to guide 
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2.4.2.1 Corporate Governance  
This sub section will look into two examples of corporate governance structures being: the 
King III code of South Africa and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United States of America 
with attention to reporting guidelines that are provided to ensure that organisations adhere to 
set standards.  
 
The King III code of conduct for corporate governance is a reference guide that has to be 
adopted mainly by all firms that are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), 
however the KPMG report on King III states that this code applies to all organisations 
regardless of whether they are in the private or public sector (KPMG, 2009). The code 
provides guidance to the board of directors, management, service providers and other 
stakeholders on recommended ways of governing the organisation; these include but not 
limited to board composition, setting up audit committees, risk committee for risk 
management, IT management and compliance. The code adopts the ‘apply or explain’ 
approach which requires organisations to implement the recommended principles and if not, 
give details that are in place and then explain the difference.  
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is a United States of America (USA) regulation that was 
passed in 2002 by congress to address challenges that public companies were having which 
had resulted in low public and investor confidence. The Act brought significant changes and 
controls for corporate governance and financial procedures, by placing strict responsibilities 
for production of financial reports on board directors, managers and auditors with strict 
penalties for failure to comply with it (Conference of State Bank Supervisors, 2010; Soxlaw, 
2006).  The main reason for SOX was to bring back the confidence of investors in financial 
reports that were produced by firms. The Act has a number of sections and subsections but of 
most importance are three sections that relate with accounting. These are responsibilities of 
Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) concerning financial reporting for 
firms; corporations or firms, mainly the board directors and the management; lastly the 
external auditors that provide services to these firms (Soxlaw, 2006). 
 
2.4.3 Cybercrime Motivations 
To have a better understanding of why individuals engage in cybercrime it would be 
necessary to look into what really motivates them to behave in such ways (Coates, 2002). Just 
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intangible ones like respect, status and supremacy (Hirshleifer, 1998). This understanding 
will help to explain why there is a range of cyber criminals from teenagers, intermediate 
hackers, to refined white-colour thieves that target large and financially strong organisations. 
 
2.4.3.1 Intrinsic Motivations 
According to intrinsic motivation theory, the driving force to do something is attributed to the 
enjoyment or interest that is achieved while doing it and not any external rewards (Deci & 
Ryan, 1985). This theory has also been used to explain why infants strive to try out new 
things in their environment as they discover them (Berlyne, 1965). According to Kshetri 
(2006) intrinsic motivation can further be grouped into two categories with some falling 
under enjoyment, while others fall under obligations. Under enjoyment the individual gets 
motivation from the fun or enjoyment that they experience while engaging in an activity. This 
is likened to the enjoyment that comes from playing a game that has different stages which 
get difficult as the player moves between the levels; hence the player will continue playing in 
order to advance in the game. The same satisfaction is achieved by attackers as they penetrate 
a system because of the challenges that they have to overcome (Kshetri, 2006). 
 
2.4.3.2 Extrinsic Motivations 
This is the opposite of intrinsic motivation, and has its roots in the economic theory which 
holds that human behaviour is driven by external incentives such as benefits (Frey, 1997). 
The anticipated benefits could either be realised immediately or at a later stage; the financial 
benefits that perpetrators anticipate to receive are seen to be a motivating influence for their 
drive to commit crime (Kshetri, 2006). 
 
2.5 Cybercrime Awareness 
This section will look at awareness of cybercrime within organisations, paying particular 
attention to general users to determine whether organisations put in any effort to ensure that 
they are made aware of information security issues. Consequences of this lack of knowledge 
will also be addressed. In this section the term information security awareness is used 
interchangeably with cybercrime awareness. 
 
With increased change and advancement of ICT such as computer networks, cyber attacks are 
becoming complicated and not easy to identify (Arpana & Chauhan, 2012); this results in 
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and their impact (Veerasamy & Taute, 2009). Often emphases is normally directed towards 
implementing strong security tools and controls to secure the system, with less consideration 
for encouraging users to have a good sense of awareness towards information security 
matters which would prevent possible mishaps in advance (Veerasamy & Taute, 2009).  
Results from a recent study in India revealed the importance of instilling cybercrime 
awareness into users in order to prevent cybercrime. The study further reported that lack of 
cybercrime awareness was prevalent across all occupations and positions in organisations, 
and this resulted in less cybercrime reporting (Arpana & Chauhan, 2012).  
 
Cybercrime awareness is often overlooked within the information security plans that 
organisations embark upon during expansion of their ICT. Most of the time they only think of 
training the technical professionals in charge of information security, and forget about the 
systems users, which leaves them as the weakest-link; hence they become the point of entry 
for security breaches. Lack of information security awareness combined with high speed 
Internet connections make organisations attractive to cyber criminals (Aloul, 2010). 
 
According to Aloul (2010) information security incidents have increased due to the following 
reasons: 
 A high increase in digital or electronic data due to computerisation of most services. 
 An increase in the number of mobile and portable devices. 
 A worldwide increase in professional cybercrime groups. 
 Increase in sophisticated information security threats originating from both internal 
and external sources. 
 The fact that it is not easy to trace most attackers. 
 Lack of security awareness by computer users, especially the ones with internet 
access. 
 
Aloul (2010) goes on to say that this increase in information security incidents is the driving 
force behind most governments’ decision to introduce laws that are meant to fight 
cybercrime. Among the reasons why information security breaches are on the rise is that, 
despite the fact that organisations are adopting advanced technology to secure their networks, 
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knowledge by users has been identified among the top risks for IT security (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2007). 
 
Information security exploits which are carried out during an act of cybercrime occur through 
computer networks of organisations (Veerasamy & Taute, 2009); therefore it is important for 
users to understand and know the nature of these exploits in order to be aware of them.  
 
 2.6 User Training on Information Security Awareness 
Aloul (2010) insists that since the hacking community is always finding new ways of stealing 
information from naïve users, organisations must do something to remove this weakest link in 
their information security plan. He suggests that users should be educated on this area and 
then apply this knowledge into their daily work life. Below are the points that are considered 
crucial for this to be effect: 
 Government should come up with cybercrime laws and then ensure that they are 
enforced. For this to be effective there is a ne d for collaboration with other 
governments since cybercrime has no border.  
 There should be Emergency Response Teams set up that would work to support and 
enhance awareness among organisations, and train cybercrime forensic teams which 
will assist in the fight of cybercrime. 
 The police department should have special trained officers whose job would be digital 
forensic investigation. 
 Organisations should provide information security training programmes for their 
employees and clients; this should be done on regular bases either twice a year to 
fight new threats that come up from time to time. This program needs management to 
set aside funds to support it.  
 The organisation should set up a central point where all communication on 
information security would be directed to make it easy for user communication. This 
will enable the organisation to adopt a proactive approach towards information 
security awareness. 
 General users are also encouraged to develop a spirit of continuously reading 
materials that address IT security matters so that they know how to protect themselves 
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Therefore, in order to realise returns from investments on ICT by African countries, further 
investment should be done on developing the user capacity to enable economic growth 
(Holmner, Britz & Ponelis, 2010). One way to do this is through user training on information 
security measures. Limitation on education prevent users from knowing what to do when 
faced with cybercrime incidents, hence they have to be made aware of cybercrime trends and 
their effects (Grobler & van Vuuren, 2010). Furthermore, training users on information 
security is regarded as crucial in order for them to protect their information. 
 
In order to create more awareness for cybercrime that will help organisations to be ready to 
address the problem of cybercrime reporting, the following four sections (2.7, 2.8, 2.9, and 
2.10) will address concepts and theories that are a closely linked to the area of information 
security. Knowledge of these concepts will be helpful to organisations and if implemented it 
shall also enable them to easily report and investigate most cybercrime incidents that they 
experience. 
 
2.7 Digital Forensic Readiness 
This section will address the issue of digital forensic readiness as a need for organisations and 
businesses that have embraced the digital age.  
 
Most organisations both private and public have implemented ICTs in their operations to 
harness the efficiency and productivity that has been commonly attributed to it (Longe et al., 
2009). Unfortunately ICT also gives rise to opportunities for unforeseen information security 
events some of which are deliberately intended to cause harm and some are just of an 
unfortunate nature; nevertheless these events result in loss in one way or another, hence 
organisations need to prepare for them in order to have digital evidence of such events 
(Barske, Stander & Jordaan, 2010).  In some instances once an incidence has occurred it is 
very difficult to locate and preserve evidence when it was of a criminal nature because 
intruders conceal or destroy any evidence that could easily reveal their tracks (Casey, 2006).  
 
The situation presented by lack of readiness by organisations to collect the needed evidence 
to point out to what really happened to a computer system in order to seek redress from it or 
even investigate it, shows organisations are not digitally ready for forensics (Casey, 2006).  
On the other hand, organisations have started to treat security breaches more serious due to 
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the realisation by Casey (2006: 49) that “network intrusions are among the most challenging 
kind of computer crimes to investigate, especially when dealing with sophisticated, highly 
motivated intruders... investigators must act quickly to locate and preserve potential evidence 
before it is lost or altered.” 
 
2.7.1 Digital Evidence  
The collection and preservation of digital evidence is central for an organisation to achieve 
digital forensic readiness, hence it is important to understand what really constitutes digital 
evidence. Casey (2004) defines it as any kind of data that can be stored processed or 
transmitted by a computer system or any device with computing or storage capability. This 
data is represented by strings of bits which can be easily manipulated, therefore digital 
evidence needs to be collected and preserved in a specific way acceptable by law (Danielsson 
& Tjostheim, 2004). 
 
In computer networked environments there are opportunities to actively gather information 
that could serve as evidence when the need arise. These include network log files, email 
communications, internet & network traffic logs, disk back-ups, transaction records, 
computers and laptops, server log files, anti-virus software log files, security system log files, 
other portable computers systems and cell phones, just to name a few. The evidence could be 
collected as normal routine to monitor the system and then used later after a crime has 
occurred (Rowlingson, 2004).  
 
It is important to understand the sources and types of potential digital evidence of an 
organisation in order to collect it properly (Casey, 2006). The sources may be broadly 
classified in four groups namely those created by users, protected by users, created by the 
computer system, and other data. Files that are created by users are those data files that the 
user creates and saves on the computer when operating programmes on the computer. Then 
there are those files that the user chooses to protect either with encryptions or password to 
make them private and limit access to them. The third type includes data files that are 
generated by the computer’s operating system and other programmes that are installed. The 
last type of other data includes any other data that enters the system or comes from outside 
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2.7.2 Digital Forensics  
Digital forensics is defined by Zatyko (2007) as making use of computer science and 
investigation methods to fulfil a legal order which requires that digital evidence should be 
analysed according to mathematical tools and procedures then presented to court by experts 
in the field. This is preceded by a proper search warrant and also with safe keeping in custody 
for preservation. Digital forensics is delicate in nature and requires careful treatment for the 
evidence produced to be acceptable. First of all it has been shown from the definition that 
there should be legal authority for it to happen; it also requires the organisation involved in it 
to be prepared in order to minimize cost (Barske et al, 2010).   
 
Vacca (2005) says the main concern of digital forensics is ensuring that accepted rules, 
procedures and legal requirements are followed while collecting evidence from computer 
systems. Therefore, this ensures that the following things can be carried out: 
 Legal authority has been sought out before conducting any search. 
 Keeping the evidence according to correct custody processes. 
 Using valid tools to conduct the analysis of evidence. 
 Conducting the analysis in a quality manner to ensure that similar results could be 
obtained by another expert. 
 Making a proper record of the findings.  
 Having an expert ready to testify on the finding in a court of law. 
 
Digital forensic focuses on maintaining integrity towards the evidence collected, which is 
why the process needs to be done in the proper way that follows all set out guidelines.  
 
2.7.3 Towards Digital Forensics Readiness 
The requirements of digital forensics call for organisations to be forensic ready; this is 
defined by Rowlingson (2004:1) as “the ability of an organisation to maximise its potential to 
use digital evidence whilst minimising the cost of an investigation.” When an organisation is 
forensic ready, this benefits it in the sense that its computer system environment has the 
ability to provide reliable digital evidence which also lowers costs associated with gathering 
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Digital forensic readiness aims to enable an organisation to be in a position to deal with any 
situation that can be resolved by providing digital evidence either to settle a dispute or prove 
otherwise in a legal proceeding or dispute (Rowlingson, 2004). The aim therefore is for 
organisations to set up an environment that is conducive for the collection and preservation of 
digital evidence (Danielsson & Tjostheim, 2004). 
 
Rowlingson (2004) gives the following goals of digital forensic readiness: 
 Collecting of digital evidence in a legally acceptable manner without disturbing the 
normal running of an organisation. 
 Collecting evidence on activities that are prune to crime and disputes that may affect 
the reputation of an organisation. 
 To minimise costs associated to digital investigation.  
 To increase success of legal proceedings that depends on digital evidence. 
 
2.7.4 Benefits of Digital Forensics Readiness 
It has already been shown that government through the adoption of e-government has 
embraced the use of ICT and thus is now connected to other information users and the rest of 
the world through the Internet (Moloi & Mutula, 2007); hence a lot of information is now 
available in digital format. Therefore, this presents a more need for government and the 
private sector to ensure that they are digital forensic ready so that they can be able to 
minimise costs associated with retrieving digital evidence whenever they need it (Sommer, 
2009). This also means that organisations can enjoy the ability to collect any required digital 
evidence without any pressure on their part since they will be assured it already exists. The 
gathered evidence can be used to settle issues of labour disputes and discipline for employees 
who have contravened any regulations (Imtiaz, 2006).  
 
Rowlingson(2004) notes that when an organisation has set up forensic readiness program and 
is also active in its implementation, this can also act as a deterrence to even internal threats by 
employees since they would know that there is evidence collected on their activities.   
 
Another benefit of digital forensic readiness is that the International Standard for Information 
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to forensic guidelines for it to be used in any legal proceedings.  The evidence collected may 
be for the following purposes:  
 To settle internal problems within the organisation. 
 To serve as digital evidence for court proceedings, breach of contract or requirements. 
 Seeking redress from service providers. 
(Saint-Germain, 2005). 
 
2.8 Cybercrime Incident Management 
This section is about cybercrime incidents and how they should be managed in order to 
address them once an organisation’s information system has been attacked. It also outlines 
responsibilities of different people in the organisation in regard to this activity. 
 
In order to properly address information security breaches experienced even by the public 
sector the breaches need to be well identified and recorded; but within the Botswana public 
sector this is currently a serious challenge and little has been done so far to identify them due 
to limited knowledge (Ngakaagae, 2010). This challenge seems to be experienced by many 
governments in Africa and other parts of the world; partly this is due to the fact that there is 
no appropriate government agency which has been tasked to deal with them and also that 
there exists no guideline structures to help with such a process (el Kettani & Debbagh, 2008; 
Ochieng, 2011).  
 
West-Brown et al. (2003) warn that there is normally a confusion that exists between digital 
forensic readiness and i cident management. They clarify the confusion by defining that the 
latter is any negative event which can breach the security of a computer system. This can be a 
virus infection, unlawful access to an organisation computer resource, theft of digital 
documents, and other similar events. Therefore, incident management deals with responding 
and resolving computer security incidents.  
 
To emphasise how different digital forensic readiness is from incidence management, Mandia 
and Prosise (2001) outline the aims of incident management as follows: 
 To find out if a security incident has occurred within a computer system. 
 To support collection of information regarding the incident at hand. 
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 To contain the interruption to the computer network and business services. 
 To enable the organisation to take legal action.  
 To give a proper report regarding the incident and guide for necessary 
recommendations. 
 
The Department of Energy (2009) in the US government has developed a comprehensive 
manual that guides the entire department on cyber incidents; it can be used as a benchmark by 
countries which do not yet have any procedure or framework that addresses cyber incidents. 
The manual outlines different processes on how to identify, categorise, contain, report and 
mitigate incidents, and goes on to even assign responsibilities that different categories of staff 
members need to do. Allocation of responsibilities in this way brings a solution to the 
problem that is identified in the section of Economic factors of cybercrime, where top 
management and the IT personnel do not have incentives to adhere to security procedures. 
The manual outlines that management should ensure that the procedures are implemented by 
the units in the department, and then the IT personnel should ensure proper execution of all 
steps that need to be followed when an incident occurs.  
 
When incidents are not managed properly, this results in challenges with the existing 
reporting methods relating to cybercrime (Smith, 2004). Therefore cybercrime reports that 
are made would not give a true reflection of what is really experienced (Richardson, 2007). 
Canhoto (2010) argues that identifying and reporting losses from cybercrime is a process that 
depends on a number of aspects that include having a sound knowledge of cybercrime, and 
also how to identify and analyse attacks. 
 
2.9 Privacy Theory 
This section looks at the privacy theory in relation to cybercrime, especially in the context of 
the public sector and its handling of citizen’s information. It also examines how this has been 
affected by ICT. 
 
Privacy is not well understood in relation to where it starts and stops, and this has now been 
made harder by the adoption of ICT for storage and processing of information. Moor (1997) 
describes information that has been digitised as “greased” information and says it slides 
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such information have no control at all to what happens to it.  The issue of privacy arises 
when improper exposure and utilisation of information occurs without even the knowledge of 
its owners or custodians. Altman (1975, 67) defines privacy as a regulated process of 
“selective control of access to the self” by imposing boundaries which affect how much 
information about a person is accessible per given time.  
 
Palen and Dourish (2003) bring up the issue of privacy management and argue that it is not 
necessarily about making rules about one’s privacy but more of managing the boundaries 
(rules or limits) at different times, places and situations of how much information is 
disclosed; boundaries reflect differences in conflicting goals between different actor and 
stakeholders such as the public and government in relation to information held about citizens.  
 
Privacy concerns have been complicated by the introduction of ICT in most government 
operations to enhance service delivery, such as the e-government initiative that Botswana 
government has embarked on where a lot of information is now computerised and can move 
through the system very easily. Palen and Dourish (2003) argue that this results in a 
disturbance in the control of boundaries of privacy in several ways: it can enhance the 
process of boundary controls; it can change the boundaries; it can serve as a means to manage 
the boundaries and also help to make it easy for participation across the boundaries.  The 
main concern is due to the fact that some of the information that is captured by government is 
highly sensitive and private therefore would require to be protected against unauthorised 
access which would be a difficult challenge with the current situation of high corruption, poor 
controls and less experience in incident management (Ngakaage, 2010).  
 
2.10 Risk Management 
This section addresses the risk aspect of digital information, and also how risks should be 
managed in the public sector. 
 
When information is digitised and availed through ICT, an element of risk is created in the 
sense that its confidentiality, integrity and availability might be compromised; such a 
compromise of valuable information results in a loss by the owner. This loss could be direct 
(devaluation in information value) or indirect (legal action, loss of reputation or service 
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event that would result in a business losing its value if it occurred; hence a risk has a cost 
associated to it which can be quantified (Harrington, 1999; Department of Treasury and 
Finance, 2007). Management of risks in business is done on a daily bases using either of the 
following: liability transfer, indemnification, mitigation and retention (Blakley et al, 2001). 
Volk (2010) advises that the best risk management method to use is the threat based approach 
which he contends, easily quantifies threats and produces a Return of Security Investment 
(ROSI) which makes it easy to use the best controls to reduce risks. 
 
Risk management seems to be working fairly well for the private sector from which 
governments can learn a lot and apply different techniques to manage their risks in order to 
achieve their goals (Volk, 2010). The objective of government is not to make profit, but 
rather to provide services to the public. There are a various departments and stakeholders that 
are involved in providing such services, who have different interests; hence this situation 
results in challenges with conventional risk management principles (Cameron & Stone, 
1995). 
 
With the utilisation of ICT in service delivery to the public, risks that were once treated 
separately are now related as different processes are linked together in the provision of 
services; these risks cannot be treated separately. Therefore the public sector needs to adopt 
sophisticated systematic risk management approaches that can enable it to achieve its 
organisational goals by assigning duties and responsibilities in the risk management process, 
where risks will be identified, classified, evaluated, treated, monitored and communicated to 
the entire organisation   (Department of Treasury and Finance, 2007).  Figure 1 below is a 
diagram that depicts the risk management process which the public sector can adopt for this 
function in order to make it easy to record and properly report on cybercrime. This process 
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Figure 4: Risk Management Process (Department of Treasury and Finance, 2007). 
 
2.11 Organisational Culture and Information Security Culture 
This section looks at organisational culture in general and also how it impacts on 
organisational performance, as discussed by different authors; a link between organisational 
culture and security culture is also established to see how the former impacts the latter.  
 
2.11.1 Definition of Culture 
Culture like cybercrime is defined in different ways. Generally it is perceived as the 
collection of common traits that have an influence on a group of human beings and how they 
respond to their environment; it also brings about social norms and values which affect 
people’s behaviour and beliefs (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2004). Other authors have also defined 
culture; Becker and Geer (1970) say it is those familiar understandings that are articulated in 
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Culture is believed to have the power to shape the behaviour of a group of people (Hofstede 
& Hofstede, 2004) in the sense that from their culture people can turn out to behave in a 
certain way in a given situation. Parson (1999) says that cultural values keep changing with 
time to incorporate new meanings or to reshape the accepted values.  Therefore, the 
introduction of ICT in the work place can be a factor that brings in change to the culture of 
users which can result in the users incorporating it into aspects of their norms and values. 
Culture has three levels: individual, organisational and national which are different from each 
other (Parson, 1999). This study will focus on organisational culture to determine its impact 
on employees’ awareness and reporting of cybercrime. 
 
2.11.2 Organisational Culture 
Organisational culture is defined in a number of ways by different authors: Martin and Siehi 
(1983) say it is a thread that keeps an organisation together based on the shared patterns of 
meaning, while Uttal (1983) sees it as those common values and beliefs that move within an 
organisation’s policies or guidelines and result in behavioural patterns. Pettigrew (1979) saw 
organisational culture to be made up of cognitive systems that define the thinking, reasoning 
and decision making process of people in an organisation which in turn affects how they 
conduct their business.  
 
Organisational culture was given much attention in the last two decades because of the effects 
and potential impact to bring success to organisations (Rashid, Sambasivan & Johari, 2003). 
Organisational culture became of interest to organisational studies around 1970 – 1980, and 
was thought that it could give an understanding to how some organisations performed poor 
than others even though they operated under similar conditions. Much research interest has 
since been generated to determine how norms and values guide employees’ behaviour for 
organisations to achieve their goals (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). Furthermore, other researchers 
of organisational culture found out that culture was responsible for guiding and shaping the 
attitude, behaviour and actions of employees (Schein, 1985; O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996; 











Page | 33  
 
2.11.3 Impact of Organisational culture on Information Security Culture 
There has been growing interest on the impact of organisational culture on information 
security culture; hence government departments and organisations in charge of regulations 
have started to show concern in understanding how organisational culture can enhance 
information security culture. This interest was motivated by the realisation that no matter how 
comprehensive the security policies are, they are influenced by attitudes and behaviour of 
employees in an organisation (Malcolmson, 2009). Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2009) also 
note that systems that are required to enforce security policies mostly depend on human 
attitudes and behaviour; hence humans pose the greatest threat. 
 
The following working definition is presented for security culture:  
“… the assumptions, values, attitudes and beliefs, held by members of an 
organisation, and behaviours they perform, which could potentially impact on 
the security of that organisation, and that may, or may not, have an explicit, 
known, link to that impact” (Malcolmson, 2009: 361).  
 
However Malcolmson (2009) also points out that there is not yet an accepted definition of 
security culture; hence it is still difficult to measure security culture because currently it is 
focused on specific characteristics of culture. Nevertheless, it is believed that if information 
security is considered to be a critical success factor for an organisation then paying particular 
attention to it is likely to lead to better performance.  
 
In most cases, the security culture in a given organisation is a result of informally learnt 
practices that are passed from one employee to another during the natural process of 
socialisation which is usually uncontrolled. This often leads to security behaviours, attitudes 
and actions that have not been approved by management of the organisation. Hence if there is 
no shared culture towards information security matters among employees then the security 
system would be rendered as insufficient (IAEA, 2008). Therefore, it should not be simply 
assumed that employees possess enough knowledge needed to enable them to perform their 
duties in a manner that is secure. Instead organisations should treat security culture as a 
component of the existing general organisational culture (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2009). 
 
Employees play a critical role for the success of any organisation, however if they are 
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This has been noted from the number of security breaches that involved insiders as compared 
to outsiders of the system; most of these incidents were found to be accidental and not 
malicious due to ignorance regarding security guidelines (Vroom & Von Solms, 2004). 
Therefore, to achieve a smooth assimilation of information security into the organisational 
culture, securing information should be integrated into the daily activities and behaviour of 
employees (Thomson, Von Solms, & Louw, 2006).  
 
Malcolmson (2009) concludes that management in organisations should adopt a culture that 
is meaningful to their environment in order to respond to security threats, and they should 
formulate policies and practices which all employees will be aware of and adhere to; the 
culture should not be a result of informal learning between the employees since this will not 
be shared by everyone.  
 
2.12 Cybercrime Legislation and Regulatory Framework 
In this section the regulatory framework and laws that are needed to address cybercrime are 
considered.  
 
There is a need to have the right laws which specify what actions are prohibited and amount 
to crime hence punishable by law (Manda, 2011). Research has however shown that 
introducing cybercrime laws cannot guarantee the elimination of cybercrime incidents; 
despite the availability of such legislation, cybercrime is still on the rise due to limitations by 
these legislations (Grobler & van Vuuren, 2010). Due to the technological nature of 
cybercrime, it is not easy to use conventional law enforcement techniques to deal with it; 
therefore, new tools and up to date legislation need to be developed to address the situation 
(Brenner, 2004; Cassim, 2009). 
 
One of the challenges found with African countries regarding cybercrime relates to failure to 
develop timely legislations and regulatory framework that encourage secure use of ICT.  
Since cybercrime has no national boundary, its fight has since been escalated to even fall 
under global organisations in order to give it more weight. However, this has not yet resulted 
in stronger cybercrime laws that can be used to tackle the problem on a global scale 
(Shackelford, 2009). Nevertheless, organisations like the UN and Council of Europe have 
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2.12.1 United Nations 
The UN through its resolutions made a number of recommendations to fight the misuse of 
ICTs by criminals. This was first done in the 1990s by UN resolution 45/121 which 
encouraged member states to increase the efforts to fight computer crimes. Another UN 
Resolutions, 55/63 and 56/121 were passed in 2001 to address the criminal misuse of ICTs; 
these called for development of a framework to fight cybercrime on a global scale. Two more 
resolutions were passed in 2002 (57/239) and 2004 (58/199) which both sought member 
states to enable a global culture that keep the cyberspace secure and also protect their critical 
infrastructure. To coordinate these resolutions easily the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) further developed a toolkit (Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation) that can be 
used by all member states to develop their own national cybercrime legislation that are 
globally focused to operate with other existing laws (ITU, 2009).  
 
2.12.2 The Council of Europe (CoE) 
The Council of Europe started with only 10 European member countries in 1949, but now has 
47 in total including non-European countries (United States, Japan, Canada and South 
Africa). Its goal is to develop common democratic principles for use throughout its member 
countries. One of its objectives includes aligning cybercrime laws and making sure that law 
enforcement agents and investigators follow the right procedures and techniques to solve 
cybercrime (Council of Europe, 2012). To fulfil its objectives, it initiated to develop 
cooperation efforts towards international cybercrime management on the already existing 
Cybercrime International Treaty in 1997. This resulted in the release of the 22
nd
 draft (treaty) 
in 2000, which was followed by voluntary guidelines meant to support the collaboration work 
between law enforcement agents (police) and Internet Service Providers (Marion, 2010). 
 
The intention of the CoE is to assist its member states and other non-member countries to use 
its convention in the fight for cybercrime. To achieve this, the organisation even goes an 
extra mile of translating the convention into local languages for countries that need to 
develop their own cybercrime laws; examples include Lao and Cambodia (Kirk, 2009). This 
has resulted in a lot of countries worldwide using the convention as a standard to come up 
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Despite the involvement of UN and CoE in development of cybercrime laws, many 
developing countries still face challenges related to developing and implementing their own 
legislation. Similarly, cybercrime of different countries do not recognise the same acts as a 
crime; hence it has been found to be difficult to prosecute crimes that are conducted in 
foreign countries (KShitri, 2006). Therefore, this still poses serious challenges for addressing 
cybercrime. 
 
2.13 ICT Adoption in Government 
2.13.1 Government vs. Governance  
This section will look at government and governance to give an understanding of how they 
relate to one another which hopefully will make it easier to deal with ICT governance within 
the public sector.  
 
The terms government and governance have the same origin but mean different things 
(Kyobe, 2010; United Nations, 2007; Deloitte, 2011). Government refers to the institution or 
organisation that has been given the mandate to have authority to direct a country or 
organisation (Kyobe, 2010). The government’s primary goal is to serve the needs of its 
citizens, thereby insuring governance (Deloitte, 2011). Therefore, governance refers to the 
processes, guidelines and structures that provide directions to the executive management on 
how to better serve citizen needs efficiently, effectively and equitably. In this regard 
governance provides control and accountability to the ones that are in government (Deloitte, 
2011; OECD, 2005).   
 
In order to avoid corruption and abuse of power by government, citizens and different 
stakeholders have begun to demand for more transparency and accountability in all processes 
and activities (Deloitte, 2011; Kyobe, 2010). This demand has been legitimised by results 
showing that good government performance is strongly related to good governance from a 
study conducted by the World Bank (Deloitte, 2011). This showed that organisations with 
good governance procedures can be expected to manage even their computer systems 
properly which would benefit them by having efficient controls to deal with information 
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2.13.2 E-Government and Governance  
This section looks at e-government (Electronic Government) and its impact on governance; it 
will define the term e-government and then briefly outline how it started within government 
and also how it altered the provision of services to citizens. 
 
E-government is defined as the utilisation of ICT by government to deliver services and also 
enhance citizen participation in a more efficient and effective way (Lipchak & McDonald, 
2003; Moloi & Mutula, 2007). In simple terms, e-government is seen as providing 
government services online. This seamless delivery method of services to citizens has been 
found as a better ways to reach many people including those in remote areas; hence 
governments have found it to be favourable since it makes governance much easier (Moloi & 
Mutula, 2007).  
 
E-government initially appeared in the form of static information that did not require any 
processing of information before being delivered to citizens. This normally involved one-way 
communicative information from service providers pertaining to different services that they 
offered to people which was published in government websites. Later on government began 
to use ICT to carry out certain transactions with businesses that provided services to it; this 
ushered in the real use of on-line transactions within government, mainly for purposes of 
purchasing goods from suppliers within controlled data networks created only for this 
purpose (Moloi & Mutula, 2007). 
 
The introduction of the Internet and the World Wide Web later provided another opportunity 
for wide variety of services and interaction to occur between government and both citizens 
and the wider business community in a more open and efficient way. This new method of 
service provision seemed to help make governance much better for citizens since it 
minimised the need for frequent visits to government offices for services that could now be 
reached online; such as applying for different permits, completing tax returns, applying for 
passports and other national registration services. This increased transparency, eliminated 
opportunities for bribes and also reduced the amount of time taken to provide services 
(Kyobe, 2010). 
 
The above mentioned benefits that have been provided by e-government however are 
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Ngakaagae, 2010); hence information security on the government network will have to be 
enhanced in order to encourage citizens to feel comfortable while utilising services that are 
offered to them. 
 
2.13.3 Corporate Governance  
In order to address the issue of information security for e-Government the following section 
will look into corporate governance structures, notably the King III code of South Africa, to 
have an insight at how this might help in addressing ICT governance to minimise risks that 
might arise from using ICT to deliver services. 
 
2.13.3.1 King III 
The King III code of conduct for corporate governance is a reference guide that has to be 
adopted mainly by all firms that are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), 
however the KPMG report on King III states that this code applies to all organisations 
regardless of whether they are in the private or public sector (KPMG, 2009). The code 
provides guidance to the board of directors, man gement, service providers and other 
stakeholders on recommended ways of governing the organisation; these include but not 
limited to board composition, setting up audit committees, risk committee for risk 
management, IT management and compliance. The code adopts the ‘apply or explain’ 
approach which requires organisations to implement the recommended principles and if not, 
give details of theirs and then explain the difference.  
 
2.13.3.1.1 Internal Audit  
 
Under this section the organisation is required to have an internal audit unit whose duty is to 
ensure that the organisation is governed well, risks are managed and also having internal 
controls. A written report of assessment of the organisation has to be given to the board and 
the audit committee (KPMG, 2009; Price Water House Coopers, 2009).  
 
2.13.3.1.2 Risk Management  
 
Risk management is treated very serious in King III to the extent that this responsibility is 
given to the board to govern all risks processes by designing and implementing a risk 
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itself with all risk scenarios that the organisation may encounter before handing the plan to 
management to execute it (KPMG, 2009; Price Water House Coopers, 2009).   
 
2.13.3.1.3 IT Governance  
 
IT governance in King III is also made to be the responsibility of the board, where the board 
needs to ensure that there is a well-defined IT charter, policies and internal control 
framework that direct the usage of IT in general. This is meant to ensure that IT is aligned 
and thereby sustains the performance objectives of the organisation; the board is then 
required to delegate the implementation of the IT framework to management directly and 
may also hire a suitable IT manager with an option of having an IT steering committee to 
oversee the overall IT framework (Price Water House Coopers, 2009).  
 
King III also put responsibility of ensuring that the organisation’s information assets are 
managed in a way that provides security to the whole IT system in accordance with IT 
regulations and standards. Furthermore, management is tasked with ensuring that the 
organisation has an IT disaster recovery plan which can be used to return normal business 
operation in case of any disruption. Therefore, the risk committee has to be certain that IT 
risks are sufficiently covered in their assessment; the audit committee should also have IT 
issues reflected in the financial reports (KPMG, 2009; Price Water House Coopers, 2009).  
 
2.14 State of ICT in Botswana Government 
The following section will look at the state of ICT in Botswana with an aim to bring an 
understanding of how it has been setup and also how this has affected the e-government 
initiative and information security. 
 
2.14.1 Overview of Botswana 
Botswana is a landlocked country in Southern Africa; sharing borders with four countries: 
Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Its surface area is around 581, 730 km
2
; 
roughly the same size as France or the state of Texas in USA. Most parts of Botswana are a 
desert with less people while more people live in towns and big villages; the population is 
about 2 million people. The capital city is called Gaborone, and English is the official 
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Botswana gained independence in 1966, and was rated as one of the poorest nations in the 
world. With the discovery of diamonds, this boosted the economy to grow very much and has 
since made the country to maintain one of the highest economic growth rate in the world 
(Mutula, 2002; OECD, 2008). Following the global recession of 2008 and other political 
changes that affected diamond sales globally, Botswana decided to diversify its economy 
away from mining and towards other sustainable sectors (IST-Africa, 2012).  
 
2.14.2 National ICT Policy 
The diversification resulted in Botswana focusing into the area of Science and Technology to 
enable it to have an economy that is driven by innovation (Mutula, 2002). An ICT Policy 
called “Maitlamo” was then developed and later approved by parliament in 2007; this would 
be used to direct the national ICT development. The policy was also seen as a guideline that 
would be used to transform the country economically, socially, culturally and politically in 
order to achieve objectives outlined in the national vision called “Vision 2016”. Maitlamo 
Policy was drafted in 2005 with input from various stakeholders, with an aim to provide 
strategic elements that will help the country to achieve its targets for national ICT 
development for both the government and private sector. The main key goals of the policy 
are: 1) To create a conducive environment for the expansion of ICT sector in Botswana; 2) to 
provide universal access to services and facilities of ICT in Botswana; 3) to position 
Botswana as a Regional hub fo  ICT services and enable the country to be competitive 
globally (Republic of Botswana, 2007). 
 
The Maitlamo Policy has the following key projects that have been outlined and need to be 
achieved in order to fully realise the objectives as set out in the policy; these are further 
elaborated below:  
 Establishing community programmes (Community Access Centres). 
 Putting government services on-line (e-government). 
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2.14.2.1 Community Access Centres 
 
The goal of the program for connecting communities was to provide affordable ICT access to 
local people in rural and disadvantaged areas, as well as urban centres. This was meant to 
help people with no access to computers and internet to be able to use them. It has resulted in 
Community Access Centres to be established in most parts of Botswana in areas like public 
libraries, schools and other suitable places with facilities to sustain them (Republic of 
Botswana, 2007).  
 
The government signed a contract with Botswana Telecommunications Corporation (BTC) of 
P350 million (US$50.1 million) in 2009 to expand the telecommunications infrastructure and 
services throughout remote areas in the Botswana to provide high speed internet connection 
(Bwalya, 2010). The purpose of these centres will be to provide access to a variety of services 
and information on-line such as government services and information on education, civil 
registration, agriculture, passport applications, health information and others. Furthermore, 
there will be local tailored information and services that serve each particular community 
according to the different categories and needs such as: age, business interests, social needs 
and others (Republic of Botswana, 2007). 
 
2.14.2.2 Government Services On-line 
 
Through the Maitlamo Policy Botswana Government sought to transform its operations to 
embrace the digital age by introducing a major change to the public service delivery, in order 
to improve the quality of services, reduce red-tape and also increase efficiency. To realise this 
vision, government established an e-Government initiative to be delivered through a state of 
the art e-Government portal for easier public access to government services. This platform 
will be accessed by most citizens that have internet access at their home or workplace, 
internet cafés as well as the Community Centres provided at most rural areas (Botswana 
Government, 2007).  
 
Some of the Government services that have been put on-line include the following:  
 Vehicle registration and licence applications. 
 On-line payments. 
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 Passport applications. 
 School registrations. 
 Business application services 
o Company registration 
o Tax return 
o Credit application 
(Botswana Government, 2007). 
 
2.14.3 ICT Infrastructure Development 
2.14.3.1 Fibre Optic Linkages  
 
In order to position itself as a major player in ICT regionally and also to maximise realising 
benefits from ICT such as cheaper bandwidth, Botswana Government joined other countries 
in the region and invested substantially around US$71.6 million for the installation of fibre-
optic cable to provide a link to the undersea West African Cable System (WACS) through 
London (shown in Figure 1). Furthermore, there was another investment into the Eastern 
Africa Sub-marine Cable System (EASSy) which cost around US$210 million (shown in 
Figure 2). This project would improve bandwidth connectivity for most countries in the 
region (Bwalya, 2010). 
 
Botswana has yet other two connections that link it through fibre cables to international 
regions with at least 622 Mbps (STM4) via South Africa, radio link with Namibia (PDH), 
Zambia (622 Mbps) and also Zimbabwe (SDH). There are arrangements to further link 
Botswana to the private undersea cable by SEACOM in Kenya (shown in Figure 1), which 
has investors in South Africa, Botswana, Kenya and overseas. These investments by 
Botswana into such ICT infrastructure have opened more opportunities for efficient 
communication channels in the country (Bwalya, 2010). 
 
2.14.3.2 Botswana Government Data Network (GDN)  
 
Botswana Government has its own data network that connects all government departments in 
the whole country. The GDN is run and maintained by the Department of Information 
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through high-speed satellite linkages to provide connection for different departments across 
the country to applications that are hosted centrally. The GDN depends on a primary 
backbone of 34Mbps, ATM links and leased lines of E1 to provide the high speed data links. 
Several applications that are hosted by GDN include the following: 
 National Identity registration (Omang). 
 Vehicle registration and licensing. 
 Accounts and revenue system. 
 Personnel and Human Resources System. 
 Patient Management System (National Patient Database). 
(Bwalya, 2010). 
 
Figure 5 below shows the ranking of African countries as far as e-Gover ment is concerned. 
The  ranking results indicate that Botswana was ranked as number 117 in 2010 compared to 
118 in 2008; an improvement by one point. The e-Government index for 2010 was 0.3637 
which was on the eighth position in the African continent. However, when compared to 
countries located in Southern Africa, Botswana came second after South Africa, as can be 
seen in Figure 6 below. 
 
 















Figure 6: E-Government Ranking for Southern Africa: Source (United Nations, 2010) 
 
2.15 Cybercrime Reports in Botswana 
This section gives an outline of cybercrime incidents that have been experienced in the 
Botswana public sector. 
 
The government of Botswana has only a few reported cases of computer related crimes due to 
the fact that as already mentioned there is lack of experience in this section which may result 
in many cases not being identified at all (Ngakaagae, 2010).  However, in 2008 the Botswana 
Government was defrauded of about P17 million as payment for three separate orders for 
drugs which were supposedly ordered and delivered to the government Central Medical Store 
(CMS) (Botswana Gazette, 2008; Mmegi, 2011).   
 
Even though there are no documented statistics for malicious code attacks and virus 
infections (Ngakaagae, 2010), it is generally expected that some of the public sector users 
have suffered from this before. The Botswana government through the e-Government 
strategy began developing websites for different ministries, even though this was a good 
initiative most of these websites were developed without even taking clients’ needs into 
consideration; as a result they did not conform to any unified standards (Moloi & Mutura, 
2007). The simple design that was adopted for these websites also poses a serious 
information security risk since no web standards have been adopted; this could even result in 
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2.16 Botswana Cybercrime Legislation 
This section talks about the cybercrime law that is available in Botswana that was adopted 
and passed by parliament to deal with cybercrime. 
 
The government of Botswana through parliament enacted the Cybercrime and Computer 
Related Crimes Act NO.22 in 2007. This act was modelled from the Convention of European 
(CoE) on Cybercrime even though Botswana has not yet signed the CoE (Ngakaagae, 2010; 
Schwarz, 2007). The Act is comprehensive in its address of this crime and is divided into the 
following sections: 
 
Part I called preliminary is a definition of all the terms that are used in the Act. It is 
interesting that this section even though it contains all terms used, it however omits defining 
what cybercrime itself means but only addresses the different offences that constitute 
cybercrime. These are as follows: 
 
Part II covers Offences as identified in the Act and also the penalty for each offence. The Act 
is very specific in the description of the offences as they are written in plain language that can 
be easily understood by most literate people; this avoids any misinterpretation that could 
occur. Below is a list of all the offences that are covered: 
 Unauthorised access to a computer or computer system. 
 Unauthorised access to computer service. 
 Access with intent to commit an offence. 
 Unauthorised interference with data. 
 Unauthorised interference with a computer or computer system. 
 Unlawful interception of data. 
 Unlawful possession of devices or data. 
 Unauthorised disclosure of password. 
 Damage to a computer or computer system. 
 Protected computers. 
 Cyber extortion. 
 Cyber fraud. 
 Electronic traffic in pornographic or obscene material. 
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 Attempt. 
 Parties to an offence. 
(Republic of Botswana, 2007) 
 
Part III covers the Procedural Powers that the Act provides for the law enforcement officers 
which are given under the orders of the commissioner of the police to collect and/or preserve 
any computer system that might be involved in any computer crime as evidence to be used 
during a trial. Below are the different elements that are included under this section: 
 
 Preservation order. 
 Disclosure of preserved data. 
 Production order. 
 Access, search and seizure. 
 Real time collection of traffic data. 
 Deletion order. 
 Acting without an order. 
 Limited use of disclosed data and information. 
 Non-compliance with order or notice. 
(Republic of Botswana, 2007) 
 
In order for this Act to be effective and utilised, it is important that incidents of cybercrime or 
computer-attacks should first be identified using methods that are acceptable so that the law 
enforcement officers can be able to present them as evidence in a court of law and/or 
government to use them to estimate losses incurred (Ngwakaagae, 2010). If that is not done 
the Act would not achieve its intended purpose. Another crucial aspect that needs to be 
carried out is employee education and awareness of this Act in order for them to be aware of 
what cybercrime in the context of Botswana entails so they can be able to know which 
activities are deemed as offences, and therefore be able to report them. 
 
2.17 Identified Gaps 
The studies that have been reviewed in the literature above have identified and agree that 
cybercrime is a global problem that threatens the information society. Furthermore, they have 
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of the studies that were reviewed are focused mostly in the developed countries; hence there 
is still a need to look at the problem of cybercrime within developing countries especially 
Africa, since these countries are relatively new on the information society. As a result they 
have a different understanding of ICT, and the context under which they operate is also 
different.  
 
Another limitation identified in the literature was that, even though the studies identified the 
factors that contribute to cybercrime; these factors have been looked at in isolation from other 
factors that are identified by other studies. Hence, there is still a need to build a framework 
that looks at these factors together in order to build a consolidated solution. Furthermore, 
there is currently little work that has been done to address cybercrime within public sector 
organisation, as most of the studies tend to focus more on private organisations. 
 
Therefore, in Botswana where the public sector has been shown to be the main driving force 
for developments and economic stimulation, it is then important to address cybercrime in this 
sector which has adopted ICT and also the e-government initiative. From previous studies, a 
comprehensive solution could not be found that can help address this sector, especially in a 
developing African country context. Therefore, this study attempts to fill this identified gap 
by investigating the different factors that contribute to cybercrime; it also goes an extra mile 
to put them into a framework and empirically validate it so that it can still be tested in other 
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Chapter 3: Research Model and Hypotheses Development  
This section uses the literature review in the previous chapter to develop a research 
framework for cybercrime reporting. The framework was developed after considering 
different factors that were reported by other authors as important items that are needed to 
improve the ability for users to report cybercrime attacks. The components considered for this 
model include organisational culture, cybercrime awareness, user training on information 
security awareness, and understanding of cybercrime legislation which have an impact on 
cybercrime reporting.  
 
The research framework will be restricted to measure the relationship between the constructs 
in one direction only as represented in Figure 7; hence it will seek to find significant positive 
relationships between these constructs. The framework is explained in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
3.1 Research Model Explanation 
To elaborate more on the identified components for the research framework; organisational 
culture was included due to the impact that authors noted such as Malcolmson (2009), who 
reported that no matter how comprehensive the security polices for an organisation maybe, 
they are influenced by the culture of employees within that organisation. Uttal (1983) 
described it as common values and beliefs that move within an organisation’s policies or 
guidelines and result in behavioural patterns. It was further noted that if there is no shared 
organisational culture towards security matters among employees then the security measures 
would be rendered as insufficient (IAEA, 2008). Therefore the link between organisational 
culture with cybercrime awareness and reporting was considered worth exploring.  
 
Furthermore, Malcolmson (2009) who noted that organisational culture has an impact in the 
successful enforcement of security on information systems in organisations; as a result 
management should formulate policies and practices that enable employees to be aware and 
adhere to information security measures. 
 
Cybercrime awareness was included based on such authors as Arpana and Chauhan (2012) 
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cyber attacks have become complicated and not easy to identify; hence this has resulted in 
frequent attacks to the network due to the fact that users have little awareness of these attacks 
and their impact (Veerasamy & Taute, 2009). Arpana and Chauhan (2012) presented results 
from a recent study in India which revealed the importance of instilling awareness into users 
as a way to prevent cybercrime. The study further found out that lack of cybercrime 
awareness was prevalent across all occupations and positions in organisations hence this 
contributes to less reporting. Aloul (2010) also reported that cybercrime awareness has been 
found to be normally overlooked within the information security plans that organisations 
embark upon during expansion of their ICT. 
 
Another item included in the research framework was user training on information security 
awareness. In order to realise returns from investments on ICT by African countries, it was 
noted that further investment should be made towards training system users (Holmner, Britz 
& Ponelis, 2010). One way identified to achieve this was through user training on 
information security measures. Limitation on education has been found as preventing users 
from knowing what to do when faced with cybercrime incidents; hence they have to be made 
aware of cybercrime trends and their effects (Grobler & van Vuuren, 2010). Furthermore, 
training users on cyber security has been regarded as crucial in order for them to protect their 
information. User training on information security could help to fight cybercrime by making 
them more aware of these attacks or risks and also emphasizing on the recommended 
solutions (Manda, 2011). Cassim (2009) also noted that uninformed users make an 
environment that is conducive to devastating attacks on an organisation’s ICT.   
 
The final component was that of understanding cybercrime legislation. A number of authors 
(Cassim, 2009; Grobler & van Vuuren, 2010; Manda, 2011) have highlighted the need for 
comprehensive cybercrime legislation that is needed to manage and control cybercrime. 
Ngakaagae (2010) also noted that challenges have been identified by both the law 
enforcement agencies, prosecutors and the general public to understand the law related to 
cybercrime as one of the impediments that hinder proper handling of cybercrime incidents 
and cases. Nyanda (2010) also reiterated the fact that a lack of understanding of the computer 
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Table 5 below provides a specific explanation to the constructs contained in the framework. 
 
Construct  Description 
Organisational Culture The shared norms, values, procedures and 
behaviours of employees in the organisation. 
Cybercrime Awareness The extent to which users have knowledge about 
cybercrime. 
User Training on Information Security Awareness The extent to which users have been given 
training on information security matters. 
Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation The knowledge of cybercrime legislation that 
users have. 
Cybercrime Reporting The ability of users to report attacks from 
cybercrime in the organisation. 
Table 6: Research Framework with Hypotheses 
 
















3.2 Research Questions 
To enable the research to achieve its objectives the following question was used to direct the 
flow: 
 What are the factors that affect the ability for users to report attacks from cybercrime 
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This was the main question, and in order to address it efficiently, it was divided into 
further sub questions that were meant to help answering it as follows:  
 
(a) How does the organisational culture of the Botswana public sector affect the 
ability for users to report attacks from cybercrime? 
(b) How does cybercrime awareness affect the ability for users to report attacks from 
cybercrime in the public sector in Botswana?  
(c) How does user training on information security awareness affect:  
 cybercrime awareness,  
 understanding of cybercrime legislation  
 the ability for users to report attacks from cybercrime in the Botswana 
public sector? 
(d) How does understanding of the cybercrime legislation of Botswana affect the 
ability for users to report attacks from cybercrime in the public sector in 
Botswana? 
 
3.3 Refined Research Objectives 
This research will have the following objectives which have been produced based on the 
focus ideas that were drawn from the literature: 
 
1. To determine the impact of cybercrime awareness on the ability for users to report 
attacks from cybercrime within the Botswana public sector. 
2. To determine the impact of understanding of Botswana Cybercrime Legislation on the 
ability for users to report attacks from cybercrime within the Botswana public sector. 
3. To determine the impact of organisational culture on cybercrime awareness and also 
on the ability for users to report attacks from cybercrime within the Botswana public 
sector. 
4. To determine how user training on information security awareness impact on 
cybercrime awareness, understanding of cybercrime legislation, and also on the ability 
for users to report attacks from cybercrime within the Botswana public sector. 
 
3.4 Development of Hypotheses  
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3.4.1 Organisational Culture hypothesis 
According to Bluedorn and Lundgren (1993) organisational culture within the public sector 
needs to be well understood since research has shown that culture plays a very critical role in 
achievement of goals. It has also been pointed out that the security of every system is 
dependent upon the security culture that is shared by the employees (IAEA, 2008).  Hence 
the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Organisational Culture has a positive effect on the Ability to Report cybercrime 
attacks within the public sector organisation 
 
Schein (1985) has reported that organisational culture has an influence on how employees 
behave which affects operations within the workplace. Burnes, Cooper and West (2003) also 
pointed out that employees use the organisational culture to choose their attitudes and 
behaviour in the workplace. Hence the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Organisational Culture has a positive effect on Awareness of cybercrime within the 
public sector organisation. 
 
3.4.2 Cybercrime Awareness hypothesis 
A recent research by QinetiQ has shown that no matter how comprehensive and strong the 
security system for an organisation is, its determinant for success is mainly the awareness 
level of its employees (Malcolmson, 2009). Furthermore, Arpana and Chauhan (2012) 
showed that there is general lack of cybercrime awareness by system users of different 
positions within organisations which contributes to less security breaches in the organisation 
being reported. Thus the following hypothesis is suggested. 
 
H3: Cybercrime Awareness has a positive effect on the Ability to Report attacks from 
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3.4.3 User Training (on Information Security Awareness) hypothesis 
Studies have shown that while organisations are expanding their technology to be advanced, 
on the other hand cyber attackers are also looking for easier ways to penetrate this technology 
by exploiting uneducated computer users who are the weakest link in the system (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2007; Veerasamy & Taute, 2009). Aloul (2010) notes that mistakes by computer 
users form part of the top threats to system security for most organisations; he then 
empirically shows that users in private or government organisations need awareness 
programs to educate them. Aloul (2010) further states that to enable system users to have a 
better knowledge of the cybercrime legislation in their countries, these laws should be 
incorporated as components into existing information security programmes.  
 
Therefore, the hypotheses are suggested as: 
 
H4: User Training on Information Security Awareness has a positive effect on Cybercrime 
Awareness. 
H5: User Training on Information Security Awareness has a positive effect on 
Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation.  
H6: User Training on Information Security Awareness has a positive effect on the Ability 
to Report cybercrime attacks within the public sector organisation. 
 
3.4.4 Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation hypothesis 
Ngakaagae (2010) identified challenges by both the law enforcement agencies, prosecutors 
and the general public to understand the law related to cybercrime as one of the impediments 
that hinder proper handling of cybercrime incidents and cases. Nyanda (2010) also reiterated 
the fact that a lack of understanding of the computer crime law hindered the police and 
government to fully control cybercrime.  
 
Hence the following hypothesis is suggested: 
 
H7: Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation has a positive effect on the Ability to Report 
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3.5 Summary of Hypotheses  
The following summary of hypotheses for the study has been developed based on the 
discussion from the literature. 
 
H1: Organisational Culture has a positive effect on the ability to Report attacks from 
cybercrime within a public sector. 
H2: Organisational Culture has a positive effect on Awareness of cybercrime within the 
public sector. 
H3: Cybercrime Awareness has a positive effect on the Ability to Report cybercrime 
attacks within the public sector organisation. 
H4: User Training on Information Security Awareness has a positive effect on Cybercrime 
Awareness.  
H5: User Training on Information Security Awareness has a positive effect on 
Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation. 
H6: User Training on Information Security Awareness has a positive effect on the Ability 
to Report cybercrime attacks within the public sector organisation. 
H7: Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation has a positive effect on the Ability to Report 
cybercrime attacks within the public sector organisation. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
In this section an illustration of how the research was conducted will be provided.   
 
4.1 Research Purpose 
This research’s purpose is exploratory in nature since it involves testing of hypothesis with an 
aim to explain how constructs of the developed framework (Cybercrime Awareness; 
understanding of cybercrime legislation; organisational culture and user training on 
information security awareness) impact on the ability to report cybercrime attacks within the 
Botswana public sector. This was achieved by collecting data that was gathered across 
different government ministries. Thereafter, in order to classify how the different constructs 
of the framework influenced awareness and reporting of cybercrime, the relationship strength 
among the constructs was assessed. The research also draws from an existing body of 
knowledge that other researchers have investigated. 
 
4.2 Research Paradigm and Approach to Theory 
The underlying philosophy for this research is positivistic and quantitative in nature. 
Positivism was chosen because it works better where there is a scientific theory, and 
empirical data is available to test and falsify the hypotheses. When there are no contradictions 
that are found during testing then the theory can safely be accepted (Association for 
Information Systems, 2010).  The study is quantitative in nature since this can better provide 
the data in numbers to represent values of the theoretical constructs that are required to test 
the hypotheses in order to provide strong scientific evidence of how the hypotheses work 
(Association for Information Systems, 2010). Therefore, this approach is deemed as most 
appropriate for this study since it will help to explain how the constructs impact on 
cybercrime awareness and reporting. Furthermore, results from quantitative studies can easily 
be generalised to the total population (Arpana & Chauhan, 2012). 
 
The research adopted a deductive approach since the developed framework was formulated 
with the help from literature (Saunders et al., 1997). Through a deductive position it was easy 
to test the framework using the quantitative data that was gathered from the questionnaires; 
this enabled the study to identify patterns that appear across different ministries which have 
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4.3 Sampling Plan 
Selection of participants should be carefully considered while designing the study in order to 
ensure that they represent the population well. The selection is normally influenced by the 
nature of the study itself, hence the selected participants should show key traits possessed by 
the general population (Bonebright, Miner, Goldsmith & Caudell, 2005). 
 
This study targeted government employees in the Republic of Botswana as its population. To 
draw the relevant sample a stratified sample approach was employed to obtain a 
representative sample from the population.  The fourteen different government ministries 
were targeted to be included; and from each ministry the following departments: IT, Human 
Resource (HR), top management or heads of department, and lastly general computer users 
(regardless of their department) were included.  Another study on cybercrime awareness in 
India also included senior managers and IT administrators in its sample (Arpana & Chauhan, 
2012).   
 
To decide which departments to include in the study purposive sampling was used; IT was 
chosen because of its involvement with day to day computer systems; while HR was included 
because it handles all the procedures and functions that deal with staff recruitment and 
training on different programs that have to be known by government employees; top 
management were included because of their leading roles in management of their respective 
departments or ministries; and general computer users were chosen in order to give a 
perspective of an average computer user regarding cybercrime awareness and reporting. The 
sample was also limited to the capital city, Gaborone since that is where all the ministries’ 
headquarters are located. Moloi and Mutula (2007) conducted a similar study on e-
government in Botswana and also restricted their sample to Gaborone for the same reasons.   
 
In order to reduce errors for the study estimates and also to guarantee a good sample size for 
strata, a stratified sample was used. To achieve this, the study aimed to include 5 participants 
from the 4 categories or strata that were identified from each ministry; making it a total of 20 
participants per ministry, and 260 from the 14 ministries. This figure was chosen bearing in 
mind that it is always a challenge to have enough responses from government employees 
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Roscoe (1975) advised that a sample size larger than 30 and less than 500 is enough for 
quantitative study; it provides a sufficient sample size which is conducive to give accuracy in 
statistical analysis (Leedy & Ormrod 2005.  The aim was to gather a total of at least 50 
responses which is deemed acceptable for quantitative analysis (Lucas, 1991). Another 
quantitative study by Ali and Green (2007) used about 54 responses to conduct its analysis, 
and this was found to be sufficient enough. However, this study was able to receive 54 valid 
responses that were used in the analysis. 
 
All government ministries were included in this study in order to provide results that can be 
generalised for the whole public sector (Moloi & Mutula, 2007). Through e-Government 
initiatives all ministries in Botswana public sector are now making uses of ICT at most levels 
of their operations and are also connected to the Internet. Therefore, there is a reasonable 
need for protecting their data and services from being affected by cybercrime.  
 
For demographic attributes such as age and gender the study did not have any specific 
requirements but just adopted the Botswana public sector age range of 21 to 65 years, both 
female and male.  
 
4.4 Questionnaire Design 
4.4.1 Overview of the Questionnaire  
Due to the nature of the study being exploratory, literature on this subject was used as the 
basis to develop questions that were used for the study. Generating research questions from 
literature has been used in other similar studies (Arpana & Chauhan, 2012).  
 
4.4.2 Questionnaire Structure & Content  
The questionnaire used in the study had three main sections. The first one requested the 
respondents to provide demographic data that was deemed non-sensitive, such as Ministry 
Name, Department, Gender, Age Group (select from given options), Nationality and 
Experience using computers (given as final question in questionnaire). The second section 
comprised of the actual questions of the survey questionnaire grouped according to their 
constructs.  
 
The survey had a total of 23 questions that were separated into five categories. The first 
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Legislation’ with four questions as well; ‘Organisational Culture’ was next with five 
question; then ‘Information Security Training’ followed with five question; while the last 
category was named ‘Cybercrime Reporting’ which also had five questions. The final section 
in the survey was an extra space provided for additional comments that the respondents might 
have wanted to make in relation to the study.  
 
4.4.3 Questionnaire Items 
The responses received from the survey results were used to attempt to find answers to the 
following research questions that were outlined in section 3.2 above:  
(a) How does the organisational culture of the Botswana public sector affect the 
ability for users to report attacks from cybercrime? 
(b) How does cybercrime awareness affect the ability for users to report attacks 
from cybercrime in the public sector in Botswana?  
(c) How does user training on information security awareness affect:  
 cybercrime awareness,  
 understanding of cybercrime legislation  
 the ability for users to report attacks from cybercrime in the Botswana 
public sector? 
(d) How does understanding of the cybercrime legislation of Botswana affect the 
ability for users to report attacks from cybercrime in the public sector in 
Botswana? 
 
In order to answer the above four questions, hypotheses that were presented in section 3.5 
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1. I understand what cybercrime is 
2. I can identify cybercrime incidents/attacks 
3. I know how to protect myself from cybercrime 





5. I know about the cybercrime law of Botswana (Cybercrime & Computer Related 
Crimes Act). 
6. I know the contents of the cybercrime law of Botswana 
7. My organisation makes its employees aware of the cybercrime law 




9. My organisation makes it easy for the staff members to report any issues of concern 
10. My organisation mostly informs all employees about critical or important 
information 
11. Employees are free to report their issues of concern to anyone regardless of 
position in the organisation 
12. My organisation provides general induction (training) to new employees 
13. Employees normally share information on critical issues in my organisation  





14. My organisation has an information security awareness training programme 
15. IT officers in my organisation are trained on how to respond to information security 
matters 
16. My organisation provides ongoing refresher courses/training on information 
security 
17. Training on information security awareness is important for my organisation 
18. Most employees (who use computers) in my organisation have received 




19. I always report cybercrime incidents that I experience 
20. I know where to report cybercrime incidents in my organisation 
21. The IT department/unit in my organisation understands what to do about reported 
cybercrime incidents 
22. I think most cybercrime incidents are reported in my organisation 
23. I know that it is important to report cybercrime incidents in my organisation 
Table 7: Constructs and Instrument items 
 
The questionnaire was measured using a five-point Likert scale with anchors from 1-5 (1-Not 
at all, 2-Little, 3-Average, 4-More than average, & 5-A lot); and respondents selected the 
answers by ticking or crossing out their choice. This was deemed suitable for this study since 
it was expected that most of participants would be lacking knowledge regarding the 
cybercrime area. Therefore, having a Likert scale (with its odd numbers) would not compel 
participants to make a selection that they were uncertain on how to rate it (Ghauri & 
Gronhaug, 2002). The research questionnaire is contained in Appendix C. 
 
4.4.4 Pilot Study 
The first developed version of the research instrument was evaluated to test its validity with 
the help of three (fellow students) colleagues, a researcher and senior lecturer from the 
University of Cape Town. Their feedback was used to adjust the research instrument to be 
relevant for the study. Significant adjustments made included rephrasing some questions to 
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that the research instrument would give reliable and accurate results needed for analysis, a 
pilot study was carried out using convenience sampling. The Botswana Consulate General 
office in Cape Town was requested to help with piloting the research instrument, where seven 
people volunteered to complete all of the questions. From this pilot study, it was 
recommended by the participants that the order of questions should be altered in order to 
have less difficult questions appear at the beginning and difficult ones to follow later on so 
that respondents feel comfortable to answer the questions. The advice and recommendations 
that were gathered while testing the research instruments were incorporated into the research 
instrument in consultation with the research supervisor.   
 
4.5 Data Collection Method 
4.5.1 Data Collection Permission 
As already stated in section 4.3, the sample for this study was limited to Botswana 
government employees in the capital Gaborone, hence to collect the data a survey strategy 
was used to enable the researcher to reach the fourteen ministries. 
 
The researcher first had to seek a written permission from the government research unit that 
was to be presented to each ministry as proof of authorisation to conduct the study. 
Furthermore, permission had to be sought out at each ministry before data collection could 
commence and failure to get this meant that the affected ministries were left out of the study.   
 
4.5.2 Quantitative Data Collection 
To distribute the survey questionnaires in each ministry different methods suitable for each 
type of respondents was used. For senior management, the questionnaires were given to their 
secretaries to arrange a suitable time for them to complete. For the IT and HR unit, the 
questionnaires were given to the unit heads to identify the people who would complete them. 
To reach the ‘general computer users’ category the researchers requested the IT unit to 
distribute the questionnaires to any five people to complete them. The respondents were 
asked to answer all the questions for their responses to be meaningful to the study; it took 
about 5-10 minutes to complete the questionnaire. The questionnaires were normally 
administered by the researcher and collected immediately. Where it was impossible to do this 
they were left at the ministries and collected within 2-3 working days in order to give 
respondents time to complete them. This exercise was repeated at all the different ministries 
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The first round of data collection did not yield much fruits since some of the respondents who 
had remained with the questionnaires reported that they had misplaced the questionnaires, 
hence this delayed the process since a new set of questionnaires had to be handed out again 
for replacement. This problem was experienced in a number of ministries.  
 
4.6 Data Analysis Techniques 
4.6.1 Quantitative Data Analysis 
After collecting data that has to be analysed in a quantitative manner, it has to be captured 
and prepared in a format that allows relevant tests to do conducted on it (Cavana et al., 2001). 
To achieve this, a spreadsheet software (MS Office Excel 2010) was used to capture all 
usable responses gathered from the questionnaire; a total of 54 responses were received. 
Thereafter, the captured data was exported to a statistical analysis software (Statistica 10) for 
further in-depth analysis of the data to test the hypotheses for the research. 
 
The following statistical tests were conducted on the data for analysis: 
 Descriptive Statistics: this was conducted in order to describe respondents’ profile 
and also to obtain their level of computer knowledge. Mean values were also obtained 
for key variables in the research framework. To determine the dispersion of data and 
also the standard deviation, Variance statistics was employed. 
 
 Graphical Representation: a spreadsheet software (MS Office Excel 2010) was used 
to produce the necessary pie charts and bar charts in order to display summaries from 
the raw data before any analysis was conducted. 
 
 Factor Analysis: the questionnaire items were analysed using Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) in order to determine whether they would group into distinctive 
factors; this further checked the constructs for validity. 
 
 Item Analysis using Cronbach’s Alpha (α): this provided tests that checked the 
research constructs for internal consistency and reliability. 
 
 Spearman’s correlation rank coefficient (r): this was helpful to establish whether 











Page | 63  
 
 The final tests were Multiple Linear Regression Analyses; these were conducted on 
the hypotheses in order to obtain the regression values for the linear equations that 
were formulated to test how the hypotheses for the research framework impacted on 
each other, to determine whether this would increase the variance explained in the 
dependent variables. 
 
4.7 Key Assumptions 
The key assumptions for the research were as follows: 
 Cybercrime is not currently managed properly in the Botswana public sector.  
 The necessary permission would be granted by the Botswana government for the 
researcher to conduct the study. 
 The study would have enough participants to enable it to meet the necessary data 
requirements for analysis. 
 The developed research framework would contribute greatly to the Botswana 
government by providing an effective tool to help in improving awareness and 
reporting of cybercrime attacks in the public sector. 
 
4.8 Data Integrity and Ethical Considerations 
The researcher submitted all documents that would be used for this research (survey 
questionnaire and research cover letter) to the Ethics Committee of the Department of 
Information Systems at the University of Cape Town for approval in order to verify that they 
adhere to ethical requirements. Furthermore, the researcher had to resubmit the research 
instruments to the Botswana government research unit for ethical and integrity approval 
before permission could be given to conduct the research. During the research all participants 
were given the relevant research instrument to read beforehand and also the researcher 
verbally explained the purpose of the research for them to choose whether to participate or 
not.  
 
To protect the identity of all respondents, the researcher made sure that personal identity was 
kept anonymous throughout the study. To achieve this there was no personal or sensitive 
information that was gathered by the research instruments. Upon collection of the completed 
questionnaires to ensure data integrity and quality, they were all checked to verify that they 
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4.9 Research Timeframe 
The research was carried out from mid-March 2012 to end of April, and took about a month 
and half to complete. This took a considerable time to do due to the fact that the researcher 
had to travel between Cape Town (South Africa) and Gaborone (Botswana) where the 
research was conducted. Furthermore   permission had to be sought from the Botswana 
Government before commencing with the research. Therefore strict time constraints were 
imposed by the duration needed to complete the study which meant that a cross-sectional 
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Chapter 5: Descriptive Statistics 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the demographic profile of the respondents that was obtained from the 
survey; it was obtained from the first part (Demographics) and also the last question of the 
questionnaire. In this section important patterns that have been identified from the sample are 
presented.  Therefore it will give an outline of the descriptive statistics for items and 
constructs that were used in the questionnaire. 
 
5.2 Sample Survey Profile 
5.2.1 Ministry 
The number of ministries that took part in the survey was 10 out of the 14 ministries in the 
government. This number is a fair representation of the government sector given that only a 
few did not participate. Those that have not been included did not participate due to the fact 
that they did not respond to the survey questionnaire which was given to them. The highest 
number of responses was 11, received from the ministry of State President; two other 
ministries also showed good responses of nine by Health, and eight from Defence, Justice & 
Security. The lowest responses came from two ministries of Foreign Affairs and Local 
Government with two responses from each. This data is illustrated below in Figure 9.  
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5.2.2 Department 
For this survey the target departments or units that were included for study are: IT; Human 
Resources; top management (grouped under Corporate Services) and other general computer 
users from any other department, these were classified under Users. The respondents from IT 
were 18, representing the majority of participants. Corporate Services had 10 respondents, 
while Human Resources had 15 respondents and lastly 11 from the User category. Human 
Resources had the second largest representation of respondents; however all the departments 
seem to have been fairly represented in the survey as shown in Figure 10 below. 
 
 
Figure 10: Department of Respondents 
 
5.2.3 Gender 
All respondents were encouraged to fill out every section of the questionnaire in order for 
their responses to be used in the study; therefore this resulted in participants indicating their 
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Figure 11: Gender of Respondents 
 
The distribution of gender for respondents shows that more males participated in the survey 
than females, 61% and 39% respectively. The number of females that participated is however 
good for the sample, since it can be rounded off to 40%. The dominance by males could be 
because there are more males than females employed in the IT sector, which also had more 
participants as compared to other departments as shown in Figure 10.  
 
5.2.4 Age 
Age distribution for the participants was dominated more by the 21 to 34 age group which 
accounted for 59% of the respondents. This was partly influenced by the fact that this group 
is still young and mostly comfortable to participate in a computer related survey; hence 
elderly employees would insist on younger employees to participate. 33% of respondents 
were from the 35 to 44 age group which also comprise relatively younger employees. The 
remaining 8% was made up of people from the 45 to 54 age group. The last two age groups 
of 55 to 64 and 65 and above were not represented in the survey. These age groups are 
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Figure 12: Respondents Age Group 
 
5.2.5 Nationality 
All of the respondents that participated in this survey indicated that they were Batswana 
(citizens of Botswana). Therefore, results of the survey would be 100% from Botswana 
citizen government employees from the participating ministries.  
 
5.2.6 Experience in computer use 
Figure 13 shows that most respondents had the necessary experience required to use 
computers efficiently. 41% responded that they possessed excellent skills; while 39% had 
indicated that their skills were very good. The remaining 20% the surveyed sample showed 
that 18% had only average skills, while 2% had little experience with computer use. 
Therefore, the results indicate that majority of respondents (80%) had proficient knowledge 
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Figure 13: Respondent Computer Experience 
 
5.3 Questionnaire Items Descriptive Statistics  
This section presents the descriptive statistics that were conducted for the questionnaire 
items; more detailed results for this breakdown are included in Appendix D. The codes that 
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Code Questionnaire Item Code Questionnaire Item 
AWARE1 
1. I understand what cybercrime is 
CULTR5 
13. Employees normally share information 
on critical issues in my organisation  
 
AWARE2 
2. I can identify cybercrime 
incidents/attacks 
TRAIN1 
14. My organisation has an information 
security awareness training programme 
AWARE3 
3. I know how to protect myself from 
cybercrime TRAIN2 
15.IT officers in my organisation are 
trained on how to respond to information 
security matters 
AWARE4 
4. I understand the impact of cybercrime 
to my organisation TRAIN3 
16.My organisation provides ongoing 
refresher courses/training on information 
security 
LEGIS1 
5. I know about the cybercrime law of 
Botswana (Cybercrime & Computer 
Related Crimes Act).  
TRAIN4 
17. Training on information security 
awareness is important for my 
organisation 
LEGIS2 
6. I know the contents of the cybercrime 
law of Botswana TRAIN5 
18. Most employees (who use computers) 
in my organisation have received 
information security awareness training 
LEGIS3 
7. My organisation makes its employees 
aware of the cybercrime law 
REPOT1 
19. I always report cybercrime incidents 
that I experience 
LEGIS4 
8. I know that the cybercrime law is 
helpful to address cybercrime in my 
organisation 
REPOT2 
20. I know where to report cybercrime 
incidents in my organisation 
CULTR1 
9. My organisation makes it easy for the 
staff members to report any issues of 
concern 
REPOT3 
21. The IT department/unit in my 
organisation understands what to do about 
reported cybercrime incidents 
CULTR2 
10. My organisation mostly informs all 
employees about critical or important 
information 
REPOT4 
22. I think most cybercrime incidents are 
reported in my organisation 
 
CULTR3 
11. Employees are free to report their 
issues of concern to anyone regardless of 
position in the organisation 
 
REPOT5 
23. I know that it is important to report 
cybercrime incidents in my organisation  
CULTR4 
12. My organisation provides general 
induction (training) to new employees 
 
  
Table 8: Questionnaire Item Codes 
 
Results for descriptive statistics that were performed for the questionnaire items showed that 
the item with the highest mean value was Item 11 (CULTR3) with (4.13) on the other hand 
the lowest meant was Item 23 (REPOT5) with (1.37). The Implications for this is that Item 11 
(CULTR3) had responses ranging between ‘More than average’ and ‘A lot’ on the Likert 
scale, while Item 23 (REPOT5) had responses between ‘Not at all’ and ‘Little’. The mean 
scores for all other items were generally very low with score below 2. The only exception 
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Chapter 6: Reliability & Validity Testing 
To ensure that the data is suitable for use in any significant statistical tests, it needs to be 
tested for reliability and validity. This is provided below. 
 
6.1 Testing for Reliability 
To establish the reliability and quality of constructs and variables used in the research 
instrument, Brown and Jayakody (2008) advice that the instrument should be checked for 
internal consistency. To achieve this Cronbach’s Alpha denoted by ‘α’ (coefficient alpha) is 
commonly used to point out the correlation between items in one set (Brown & Jayakody, 
2008; Molla, 2001).  An alpha threshold value of 0.80 for Cronbach Alpha is recommended 
although other authors (Nunnally, 1978; Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson & Tatham, 2006) advice that for exploratory studies the threshold can be set to 0.60 
even though it is ideal to have a value that is more than 0.70 for a higher reliability for items 
in a construct (Tan & Teo, 2000). 
 
In addition an item analysis was performed on the items in each construct. According to Hart, 
Esat, Rocha and Khatieb (2007) to conduct an item analysis a construct should contain at 
least three items (questions) in it, and this was met by all constructs in this study. All of the 
five constructs showed to have very strong correlation between their items (questions), with 
Organisational Culture (O_Culture) showing the lowest Cronbach Alpha (α) value of 0.63. 
Three constructs (Awareness, Legislation and Training) loaded up ‘α’ values greater than 0.8 
while one (Reporting) loaded α value of 0.76. This showed that their items are strongly 
reliable and acceptable for use in further statistical analysis. A summary of these results is 
shown below in Table 8, while the full result can be found in Appendix F. 
 
Construct Full Name Construct Identity Items Cronbach (α) 
Cybercrime Awareness Awareness 4 0.83 
Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation Legislation 4 0.83 
Organisational Culture O_Culture 5 0.63 
Information Security Training  Training 5 0.84 
Cybercrime Reporting Reporting 5 0.76 
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6.2 Validity Testing 
The researcher conducted factor analysis on the data that was received from respondents. 
This was done in order to observe what patterns would emerge from the variables to show 
whether any factors could be generated efficiently without losing much information (Hair, 
Black, Babin & Anderson, 2006). Two types of factor analysis are outlined in DeCoster 
(1998) as Exploratory, which seeks to identify underlying constructs that influenced 
responses; and Confirmatory, which focus on whether responses are influenced by constructs 
in a specific manner. This research adopted the exploratory factor analysis since it was found 
suitable to test the constructs’ validity. Furthermore confirmatory factor analysis has been 
reported to be restrictive in nature while exploratory is not and also is more used than 
confirmatory (Peterson, 2000). 
 
Peterson (2000) states that the goal of factor analysis is achieved when the number of items 
that convey the defined constructs has been fully or partially extracted from the data; this will 
show that the construct is valid. The loading of the factors represent how the variables and 
factors correspond to one another (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham, 2006). There 
seems to be no general stated rule for choosing the threshold for factor loading, however as ‘a 
rule of thumb’ 0.50 is normally accepted (Merenda, 1997). Other authors state different 
thresholds for determining factor loadings due to lack of consensus on this issue; Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham & Black (1998) note that factor loading of more than 0.30 meets the 
minimal requirement, 0.40 are more important, while loadings of 0.50 and above are more 
significant. 
 
The researcher conducted exploratory factor analysis on all variables with the following 
criteria: 
 Threshold value  : > 0.55 
 Rotation Method  : Varimax Normalised 
 Minimum eigenvalue  : 1.000 
 Maximum factors  : 5 
 
The summary for results of the factor analysis is presented in Table 9 below, while full 
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generally well in factors matching their expected constructs; they also loaded with values 
greater than 0.60 except for only one item under factor 1.  
 
However, two constructs did not manage to have all of their items loading up in the factors.  
These were Organisational Culture (Factor 5) where the first and last items did not load up at 
all, (CULTR1 and CULTR5); and User Training on Information Security Awareness (Factor 
4) with the last item (TRAIN 5) not loading up as well. 
 
Generally as already mentioned about, most items loaded with values greater than 0.60 in all 
constructs and factors, except for only a few items as identified above. Therefore, the results 
from the exploratory factor analysis show acceptable validity for the constructs of the 
research instrument.  
 
 
Factor Loadings (Varimax normalized)  
Extraction: Principal components 
(Marked loadings are >.550000) 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
AWARE1  0.842051    
AWARE2  0.863327    
AWARE3  0.769254    
AWARE4  0.680171    
LEGIS1   0.819750   
LEGIS2   0.695558   
LEGIS3   0.783965   
LEGIS4   0.839818   
CULTR1      
CULTR2     0.615359 
CULTR3     0.809004 
CULTR4     0.785897 
CULTR5      
TRAIN1    0.791371  
TRAIN2    0.832947  
TRAIN3    0.867555  
TRAIN4    0.701890  
TRAIN5      
REPOT1 0.831764     
REPOT2 0.795239     
REPOT3 0.701893     
REPOT4 0.566906     
REPOT5 0.607170     
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6.3 Eigenvalue Analysis 
Hart et al. (2007) states that the purpose of the Eignvalue analysis is to show how much each 
factor explains the variance which is accumulated for the whole questionnaire items. Results 
of the Eignvalues for this study based on the 23 items from the questionnaire that loaded into 
5 factors accounted for a cumulative variance value of 62.6%, which for an initial study 
presents fairly acceptable overall construct validity. Table 10 below shows the results of the 
Eigenvalue analysis.  
 
  
Eigenvalue % Total variance Cumulative Eigenvalue Cumulative (%) 
Factor 1 4.554872 19.80379 4.55487 19.80379 
Factor 2 3.035866 13.19942 7.59074 33.00321 
Factor 3 2.842333 12.35797 10.43307 45.36118 
Factor 4 2.108933 9.16927 12.54200 54.53045 
Factor 5 1.852229 8.05317 14.39423 62.58362 
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Chapter 7: Results and Discussion 
This chapter presents the tests that were carried out on the hypotheses that were presented in 
section 3.5; this was done in two phases.  The first test was a Correlation Analysis that was 
carried out using Spearman Ranking Correlation, while the other one was an analysis done 
with the help of a Multiple Regression technique. These two tests are elaborated further on in 
the following sub sections.  
 
7.1 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation analysis was conducted on all five constructs of the research framework that 
was developed for this study in order to determine the strength of relationships. These 
constructs were presented as follows: Cybercrime Awareness (AWARENESS), 
Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation (LEGISLATION), Organisational Culture 
(O_CULTURE), User Training on Information Security Awareness (TRAINING) and finally 
Cybercrime Reporting (REPORTING).  The correlations between these constructs were 
established by using non-parametric testing called Spearman Rank Correlation. This test was 
used because of two reasons; the first being that it is suitable to handle sample data that was 
derived by means of a Likert scale (e.g. with ranking from 1 – 5), and secondly it does not 
need any assumption on the distribution for the sample (Hart et al., 2007). The results of this 
test are illustrated by the correlation matrix in Table 11 below. 
 
Variable 
Spearman Rank Order Correlations (All_Constructs) 
MD pairwise deleted 
Marked correlations are significant at p <.05000 
  AWARENESS LEGISLATION O_CULTURE TRAINING REPORTING 
AWARENESS 1.000000         
LEGISLATION -0.014699 1.000000       
O_CULTURE 0.269948 -0.018398 1.000000     
TRAINING 0.352139 0.222157 0.133159 1.000000   
REPORTING 0.407346 0.291043 0.096934 0.424312 1.000000 
Table 12: Correlation Analysis Results 
 
The correlation matrix from Table 11 above shows that most the constructs that were 
associated with each other in the Cybercrime Reporting framework in Section 3.5 have a 
significant positive correlation with one another at 5% significance level (p<0.05); only two 
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correlated failed to show this relationship. These are Cybercrime Legislation 
(LEGISLATION) and Information Security Training (TRAINING) which showed a non-
significant positive correlation (r=0.22). The other pair of constructs was between 
Cybercrime Reporting (REPORTING) and Organisational Culture (O_CULTURE) that 
yielded an insignificant correlation value (r=0.10). The positively significantly correlated 
constructs had the following correlation values: Cybercrime Awareness (AWARENESS) and 
Organisational Culture (O_CULTURE) was (r=0.27); Cybercrime Awareness 
(AWARENESS) and Information Security Training (TRAINING) was (r=0.35); Cybercrime 
Reporting (REPORTING) and Cybercrime Awareness (AWARENESS) was (r=0.41); 
Cybercrime Reporting (REPORTING) and Cybercrime Legislation (LEGISLATION) was 
(r=0.29); and finally Cybercrime Reporting (REPORTING) and Information Security 
Training (TRAINING) was (r=0.42) which also showed the strongest correlation. 
 
To show the relationship for hypotheses in the research framework, their correlation analysis 
summary is presented below in Table 12. 
 
Hypotheses Constructs tested Correlation Value  
( r value) 
Relationship 
H1 REPORTING vs. O_CULTURE 0.10 Non-significant 
H2 AWARENESS vs. O_CULTURE 0.27 Significant 
H3 REPORTING vs. AWARENESS 0.41 Significant 
H4 AWARENESS vs. TRAINING 0.35 Significant 
H5 LEGISLATION vs. TRAINING 0.22 Non-significant 
H6 REPORTING vs. TRAINING 0.42 Significant 
H7 REPORTING vs. LEGISLATION 0.29 Significant 
Table 13: Correlation Analysis Summary 
 
It was interesting to note that most hypotheses from the research framework had a positive 
significant correlation to one another; this showed that to a certain degree they were related. 
To help determine the hypotheses that will be accepted or rejected, the following section will 
subject the variables to further analysis using Multiple Regression.  
 
7.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
To evaluate the association between dependent and independent variables, the hypotheses 
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beta value (β) and coefficient of determination (R
2
) for each hypothesis relationship is 
calculated (Van der Heijden, 2003).  
 
Garson (2008) outlines the equation for analysing multiple regression in this format: 
 
Y1 = b1X1 + b2X2 + ... + bnXn + c  
The symbols represent:  
 
 Y1 (dependent variable);  
 X1, X2, Xn (independent variables);  
 b1, b2, bn (regression coefficients for dependent variable Y1);  
 c (constant) which shows what the dependent variable Y1 is when (X1, X2, Xn) 
independent variables  are equal to 0 and the regression line meets with the y axis. 
 
To test the hypotheses associations generated for this research, the multiple regression 
equations below were formulated: 
 
Equation 1:  REPORTING = a + h1 * O_CULTURE + h3 * AWARENESS + h6 * 
TRAINING + h7 * LEGISLATION  
 
Equation 2:  AWARENESS = b + h2 * O_CULTURE + h4 * TRAINING  
 
Equation 3:  LEGISLATION = d + h5 * TRAINING  
 
The symbols in the above equations represent the following: h1 to h7 are the beta values (β) 
for the respective hypotheses while a, b & d are the constants.  
 
7.2.1 Regression Analysis Results for Equation 1 
The above equations (1-3) are of the recursive simultaneous model and can be estimated by 
separate multiple linear regression analysis done on each of them (Pindyck & Rubinfield, 
1998). Therefore, hypotheses H1, H3, H6 and H7, (Equation 1) were first tested. This equation 
had the following independent variables: Organisational Culture (O_CULTURE), 
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(TRAINING) and Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation (LEGISLATION), while 
Cybercrime Reporting (REPORTING) was the dependent variable. Table 14 shows the 
multiple regression analysis results for Equation 1. 
 
N=54 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: Reporting 
(All_Constructs_Responses Cybercrime) 
R= .56843172 R²= .32311462 Adjusted R²= .26785867 







Intercept     0.283098 0.305688 0.926102 0.358932 
AWARENESS 0.326400 0.130658 0.246943 0.098852 2.498116 0.015890 
LEGISLATION 0.259562 0.122113 0.220298 0.103641 2.125590 0.038603 
O_CULTURE -0.006003 0.123640 -0.004882 0.100558 -0.048549 0.961476 
TRAINING 0.261037 0.129054 0.235285 0.116323 2.022694 0.048580 
Table 14: Equation 1 Regression Analysis Results 
 
The coefficient of determination (R
2
) value for the multiple regression model of Equation 1 
was 32.31%. This means that 32.31% of the total variation in Cybercrime Reporting 
(REPORTING) can be explained by the independent variables (Cybercrime Awareness, User 
Training on Information Security, and Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation). These 
results are explained more in Section 7.3.  
 
Equation 1 thus becomes:  
REPORTING = 0.283 + 0.247 * AWARENESS + 0.235 * TRAINING + 0.220 * 
LEGISLATION 
 
7.2.2 Regression Analysis Results for Equation 2 
Multiple linear regression tests were then performed on Hypotheses H2 and H4 (Equation 2). 
The independent variables for this equation were Organisational Culture (O_CULTURE) and 
User Training on Information Security (TRAINING), the dependent variable on the other 
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N=54 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: Awareness 
(All_Constructs_Responses Cybercrime) 
R= .42470594 R²= .18037513 Adjusted R²= .14823298 







Intercept     0.430653 0.387490 1.111390 0.271613 
O_CULTURE 0.275375 0.127640 0.296030 0.137214 2.157436 0.035706 
TRAINING 0.292856 0.127640 0.348899 0.152066 2.294396 0.025918 
Table 15: Results for Equation 2 Regression Analysis 
 
Equation 2 had coefficient determination (R
2
) value of 18.03% for its multiple regression 
analysis. This means that 18.03% of the total variation in Cybercrime Awareness 
(AWARENESS) can be explained by the independent variables (Organisational Culture, and 
User Training on Information Security).  
 
Equation 2 thus becomes:  
AWARENESS = 0.431 + 0.296 * O_CULTURE + 0.349 * TRAINING 
 
7.2.3 Regression Analysis Results for Equation 3 
Multiple linear regression was tested for Equation 3 using Hypotheses H5. This equation had 
its independent variable as User Training on Information Security (TRAINING), whilst the 
dependent variable was Cybercrime Legislation (LEGISLATION). Table 16 shows the 
results for Equation 3. 
 
N=54 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: Legislation 
(All_Constructs_Responses Cybercrime) 
R= .24299930 R²= .05904866 Adjusted R²= .04095344 







Intercept     1.131422 0.227546 4.972284 0.000008 
Training 0.242999 0.134518 0.258065 0.142858 1.806438 0.076638 
Table 16: Results for Equation 3 Regression Analysis 
 
Equation 3 had coefficient determination (R
2
) value of 5.90%, which means that 5.90% of 
observed total variation in Cybercrime Legislation (LEGISLATION) can be explained by the 
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Equation 3 thus becomes:  
LEGISLATION = 1.131 + 0.258 * TRAINING  
 
7.3 Results of the Hypothesis Testing 
Below (Table 17) are the results that were obtained from hypotheses testing in section 7.1 and 

































0.247 0.015890 Yes 








0.349 0.025918 Yes 








0.258 0.076638 No 















0.220 0.038603 Yes 
Table 17: Results of Hypothesis Testing 
 
To give a better understanding of which hypotheses were supported and those that were not, 
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Hypothesis Description Supported/ 
Not Supported 
H1 Organisational Culture has a positive effect on the ability to 
Report attacks from cybercrime within a public sector 
organisation. 
 
H2 Organisational Culture has a positive effect on Awareness of 
cybercrime within the public sector organisation.  
H3 Cybercrime Awareness has a positive effect on the Ability to 
Report attacks from cybercrime within a public sector 
organisation. 
 
H4 User Training on Information Security Awareness has a 
positive effect on Cybercrime Awareness.  
H5 User Training on Information Security Awareness has a 
positive effect on Understanding of Information Security 
Regulations. 
 
H6 User Training on Information Security Awareness has a 
positive effect on Ability to Report attacks from cybercrime 
within a public sector organisation. 
 
H7 Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation has a positive 
effect on the Ability to Report attacks from cybercrime within 
a public sector organisation.  
 
Table 18: Outlined Testing Results of Hypotheses 
 
Comparison of how the R
2
 values have changed between results of correlation analysis 
(Table 13) and multiple regression analysis are given below in Table 19. 
Relationship  Construct  R value R2 Value Multiple Regression R2  Value 
Reporting vs. Training Training 0.42 0.18 0.32 
Reporting vs. Awareness Awareness 0.41 0.17 0.32 
Reporting vs. Legislation Legislation 0.29 0.08 0.32 
Awareness vs. Culture Culture 0.27 0.07 0.18 
Awareness vs. Training  Training 0.35 0.12 0.18 
Table 19: Comparison of R
2
 values for Correlation and multiple regression results 
 
From Table 19 it can be seen that the best improvement to R
2
 values was on the Training 
construct (Reporting vs. Training), with a percentage increase from 0.18 to 0.32; followed by 
Awareness increasing from 0.17 to 0.32. For the Awareness dependent variable, the 
improvement on R
2
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7.4 Hypothesis Testing and Discussion 
In this section the results obtained for the hypotheses that were tested in the previous section 
will be discussed. This will be achieved by considering each hypothesis in relation to the 
literature from which it was suggested.  
 
7.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Was Not Supported 
H01: Organisational Culture has no effect on the ability to Report attacks from cybercrime 
within a public sector organisation. 
H11: Organisational Culture has a positive effect on the ability to Report attacks from 
cybercrime within a public sector organisation. 
 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable p-level Conclusion 




0.961476 Accept null 
hypothesis (H01) 
Table 20: Results Summary - Hypothesis 1 
 
Table 20 above shows that the regression analysis for hypothesis H1 produced a p-value of 
0.96147 which is evidently greater than the threshold of 0.05. Therefore, this makes it 
impossible to reject the null hypothesis; hence this provides not enough evidence to prove 
that indeed organisation culture has an effect on the ability to report attacks from cybercrime 
in the public sector in Botswana. The implication from this is that even if public employees in 
Botswana may find that their organisational culture enabled them to perform better or be 
productive at work, they how ver did not think that it contributed to their ability to report 
cybercrime incidents that they experienced in their organisations.  
 
The obtained results seem to be contradicting research by Malcolmson (2009) who reported 
that no matter how comprehensive the security policies for an organisation maybe, they are 
influenced by the culture of employees within that organisation. These results might however 
have been influenced by the considerably few responses that were obtained from the research. 
 
7.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Was Supported 
H02: Organisational Culture has no effect on Awareness of cybercrime within the public 
sector. 
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Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable p-level Conclusion 





0.035706 Reject null 
hypothesis (H02) 
Table 21: Results Summary - Hypothesis 2 
 
The above results shown in Table 21 supported this hypothesis (H2) since it had a p-value of 
(0.035706) which was less than the 0.05 threshold. Therefore, this can be used as enough 
reason to reject the null hypothesis and furthermore provide ground for conclusion that there 
is evidence which is strong enough for inferring that Organisational Culture has a significant 
effect on Awareness of cybercrime within the public sector. Hence this means that the more 
enabling the organisational culture is for employees to be productive and efficient, then the 
more they will find it easier to be aware of cybercrime within the Botswana public sector. 
These results seem to be consistent with earlier research that was done by Malcolmson (2009) 
who noted that organisational culture has an impact in the successful enforcement of security 
on information systems in organisations; as a result management should formulate policies 
and practices that enable employees to be aware and adhere to information security measures. 
Furthermore, these results are still supported by other researchers (IAEA, 2008). 
 
7.4.3 Hypothesis 3: Was Supported 
H03: Cybercrime Awareness has no effect on the Ability to Report attacks from cybercrime 
within the public sector. 
H13: Cybercrime Awareness has a positive effect on the Ability to Report attacks from 
cybercrime withi  the public sector. 
 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable p-level Conclusion 




0.015890 Reject null 
hypothesis 
(H03) 
Table 22: Results Summary – Hypothesis 3 
 
It is evident from Table 22 above that hypothesis H3 fielded a p-value of (0.015890) which is 
far less than 0.05 and this gives enough evidence not to accept the null hypothesis; hence it 
can be inferred that indeed Cybercrime Awareness has a significant effect on the Ability to 
Report attacks from cybercrime within the public sector. The results obtained are endorsed by 
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lack of cybercrime awareness by system users of different positions within organisations 
which contributes to less security breaches in the organisation being reported; hence if 
awareness was high then they will be more likely to report these incidents when they 
experience them.  
 
7.4.4 Hypothesis 4: Was Supported 
H04: User Training on Information Security Awareness has no effect on Cybercrime 
Awareness within the public sector. 
 
H14: User Training on Information Security Awareness has a positive effect on Cybercrime 
Awareness within the public sector. 
 
 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable p-level Conclusion 





0.025918 Reject null 
hypothesis 
(H04) 
Table 23: Results Summary - Hypothesis 4 
 
The regression analysis for hypothesis H4 (Table 23) obtained a p-value of 0.025918 which 
happens to be less than 0.05; this means the null hypothesis cannot be accepted. The 
conclusion for this is that enough evidence is available to warranty inferring that User 
Training on Information Security Awareness has a significant effect on Cybercrime 
Awareness. This means that if employees in the public sector have been provided training on 
information security awareness within their organisation, then they will be more aware of 
cybercrime incidents that they encounter. The above results are consistent findings by several 
researchers (Aloul, 2010; Cassim, 2009; Grobler & van Vuuren, 2010) who reported that 
information security training given to system users will equip them to be able to identify and 
respond to potential attacks against their system. This was also supported by Holmner et al., 
(2010) and Whitman and Mattord (2007).  
 
7.4.5 Hypothesis 5: Not Supported 
H05: User Training on Information Security Awareness has no effect on Understanding of 
Cybercrime Legislation. 
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Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable p-level Conclusion 






0.076638 Accept null 
hypothesis 
(H05) 
Table 24: Results Summary - Hypothesis 5 
 
The results that were obtained from the regression analysis (Table 24) for hypothesis H5 
produced a p-value of 0.076638 which is greater than 0.05 which could not support this 
hypothesis. Therefore, this failed to provide sufficient evidence against the null hypothesis. 
Hence it can be inferred that User Training on Information Security Awareness has no effect 
on Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation. These findings are not in line with what has 
been reported by Aloul (2010) that to enable system users to have a better knowledge of the 
cybercrime legislation in their countries, these should be incorporated as components into 
existing information security training.  
 
7.4.6 Hypothesis 6: Was Supported 
H06: User Training on Information Security Awareness has no effect on Ability to Report 
attacks from cybercrime within the public sector. 
H16: User Training has a positive effect on Ability to Report attacks from cybercrime 
within a public sector organisation. 
 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable p-level Conclusion 







0.048580 Reject null 
hypothesis 
(H06) 
Table 25: Results Summary - Hypothesis 6 
It is evident from Table 25 above that hypothesis H3 yielded a p-value of (0.048580) which is 
far less than 0.05 and this gives enough evidence not to accept the null hypothesis; hence it 
can be inferred that indeed User Training on Information Security Awareness has a 
significant effect on Ability to Report attacks from cybercrime within the public sector. 
 
7.4.7 Hypothesis 7: Was Supported 
H07: Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation has no effect on the Ability to Report 
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H17: Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation has a positive effect on the Ability to 
Report attacks from cybercrime within the public sector. 
 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable p-level Conclusion 






0.038603 Reject null 
hypothesis 
(H07) 
Table 26: Results Summary - Hypothesis 7 
 The above results shown in Table 26 supported this hypothesis (H2) since it had a p-value of 
(0.038603) which was less than the 0.05 threshold. Therefore, this can be used as enough 
reason to reject the null hypothesis and furthermore provide ground for conclusion that there 
is evidence which is strong enough for inferring that Understanding of Cybercrime 
Legislation has a significant effect on the Ability to Report attacks from cybercrime within 
the public sector. This is further supported by a number of authors (Cassim, 2009; Grobler & 
van Vuuren, 2010; Manda, 2011) who have highlighted the need for comprehensive 
cybercrime legislation that is needed to manage and control cybercrime.  
 
7.5 Summary of Results and Refined Model 
The four constructs listed below (from Section 3.4) were assumed to have an effect on the 
ability to report attacks from cybercrime in organisations within the public sector in 
Botswana. They are: 
 
1. O_CULTURE: Organisational Culture. 
2. AWARENESS: Cybercrime Awareness. 
3. TRAINING: User Training on Information Security Awareness. 
4. LEGISLATION: Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation. 
 
The above constructs resulted in development of seven hypotheses which were then 
investigated through the data analysis stage. After analysing the data only five hypotheses 
were supported. Therefore, from the findings of the data analysis the initial research 
framework with hypotheses that was presented in Figure 8 was refined as shown in Figure 14 
below; the coefficient values (r) for each relationship have also been shown with an asterisk 





























Figure 14: Refined Framework for Cybercrime Reporting 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1 Background 
 
The government of Botswana has embraced the use of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) which is now wide spread in its different departments and public 
institutions around the country in order to improve productivity and efficiency for service 
delivery (Kyobe, 2010; Moloi & Mutula, 2007). This increase in ICT adoption has resulted in 
problems such as cybercrime to be realised even by the public sector in Botswana and other 
African countries due to poor controls and lack of cybercrime legislation that are needed to 
secure the infrastructure; hence criminals act as they please (Ngakaagae, 2010). 
 
In response to the above situation this study was initiated with an aim to investigate factors 
that impact on the ability of the Botswana public sector from reporting properly on 
cybercrime attacks. Therefore, the study had the following main goal:  developing a research 
framework and then validating it empirically within the Botswana public sector.  
 
To develop this framework, previous academic literature on cybercrime and information 
security on the following areas was reviewed: cybercrime awareness (Aloul, 2010; Arpana & 
Chauhan, 2012; Malcolmson, 2009); user training on information security awareness 
(Cassim, 2009; Grobler & van Vuuren, 2010; Holmner et al., 2010); organisational culture 
(Malcolmson, 2009; Uttal, 1983); and cybercrime legislation (Cassim, 2009; Grobler & van 
Vuuren, 2010; Manda, 2011). These were used to build the framework for Cybercrime 
Reporting. In the assessed literature available on cybercrime, no suitable research framework 
was identified which could be used to address the area that was under investigation. 
Therefore, concepts that were gathered from literature were synthesised to develop a 
framework that was later tested in the study.  
 
8.2 Testing of Research Framework 
The research instrument was tested for quality and validity through piloting. Furthermore, 
data obtained from the questionnaires was statistically tested against the hypotheses that were 
developed for the research framework constructs. The research instrument was also checked 
for reliability and validity, and finally correlation and multiple linear regressions analysis 
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8.3 Key Findings 
The results from this study helped to reveal which independent variables of the research 
framework (AWARENESS, O_CULTURE, LEGISLATION, and TRAINING) had an 
impact on the dependent variable (REPORTING). It emerged that Cybercrime Awareness 
(AWARENESS), Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation (LEGISLATION) and User 
Training on Information Security Awareness (TRAINING) were the only ones that 
significantly affected Cybercrime Reporting (REPORTING); while Organisational Culture 
(O_CULTURE) did not. On the other hand, Cybercrime Awareness (AWARENESS) was 
found to be significantly affected by Organisational Culture (O_CULTURE) and User 
Training on Information Security Awareness (TRAINING). Most of these results were 
consistent with what other studies that were used to develop the research framework had 
reported.   
 
The result from the analysis of the 5 constructs together with the 5 hypotheses relationships 
that were supported in the multiple regression analysis provide a sufficient way to understand 
the interaction between Organisational Culture, Cybercrime Awareness, User Training on 
Information Security Awareness, Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation, and Cybercrime 
Reporting in the Botswana public sector.  
 
8.4 Implications for Academics 
Several studies have addressed the growing problem of cybercrime in Africa and globally due 
to an increase in ICT and also lately due to increase in broadband access. Most of these 
studies have been conducted in the developed countries; hence they may not provide 
meaningful solutions for many of the developing countries that have different contexts or 
situations from those that are present in developed nations. Furthermore, these studies have 
addressed cybercrime mostly from the private sector perspective which is mainly profit 
driven and hence has more incentives to address the problem. Fewer studies have addressed 
cybercrime in the government or public sector given the increase in ICT use.  
 
Therefore, this research will contribute to the body of knowledge in IS/IT literature on 
cybercrime, with emphases on provision of a solution (framework) to help address this 
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shown to be reliable for use, and can be used in future quantitative studies to determine 
factors that affect the ability for reporting of cybercrime for organisations in other non-profit 
making sectors. Furthermore, the inclusion of organisational culture in this framework is a 
significant contribution to the research field of IS towards the management of cybercrime 
since it emphasises the interaction of human beings and ICT. Other IS researchers can expand 
and modify this framework in order to apply in other sectors and countries. 
 
8.5 Implications for Practitioners 
Results obtained from this study can significantly be of benefit to the Botswana Government 
in its efforts to address the issue of cybercrime reporting among its employees. First of all, 
the Botswana Government can adopt the developed research framework in all its ministries 
(organisations) in order to ensure that there is a unified way of dealing with cybercrime. This 
will enable ministries that had already put in place measures to tackle this problem to be able 
to realign their efforts accordingly, while providing the ones that had not yet started to 
address it with a guideline to follow.  
 
Adopting findings from this study can be done in such a way that they are integrated into 
already existing programmes within the organisations, such as training on ICT use for 
employees, and general induction training for new employees. Contents of these training 
programmes could incorporate Cybercrime Awareness, Information Security matters and 
concepts of the Cybercrime Legislation of Botswana for instance, so that the employees are 
made aware of this problem at the initial time that they start using ICTs. This would help 
them to appreciate the risks that are involved with using ICT as far as cybercrime is 
concerned. Hopefully this knowledge will make users more vigilant and also report most 
incidents that they encounter. 
 
Results of this study can also help top management in government organisations to appreciate 
and understand that the problem of cybercrime is not only the responsibility of the IT 
department alone, but rather involves everyone in the organisation. Therefore, this could help 
to motivate management to include cybercrime management in their strategies and also 
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Another important finding of this study is that Cybercrime Reporting is dependent on a 
number of factors (constructs), which should be put in place to enable users to report easily. 
Therefore, this implies that an environment conducive for reporting should be created. Part of 
this involves having a facility where incidents can be reported, and also training the IT 
officers to be able to understand how to handle cybercrime incidents that are reported to 
them. Therefore, this would require that incidents should be managed properly, and 
furthermore the IT environment should also be conducive to collect evidence (digital forensic 
readiness) relating to these incidents when the need arises (Saint-Germain, 2005).  
  
8.6 Limitations and Further Research 
There are a number of limitations that have be considered while interpreting results from this 
study, these can also form bases for future research in order to expand its scope. The 
limitations include the sample for the study and also the procedure that was used to collect 
the data.  
 
The study sample was focused on views of top management, human resources (HR) 
department, IT department, and general IT users within different government organisations 
(ministries) in the capital city (Gaborone). However this sample left out many other 
departments and areas of Botswana which might be using ICT more than the selected sample. 
Furthermore, the number of respondents that was obtained from this study was small 
compared to the total number of employees in Botswana public sector.  
 
Furthermore, the study did not use any demographics such as department, age or gender as 
independent variables. This was only summarised with descriptive statistics and 
representations through graphs. Therefore, further studies could conduct some statistical 
analysis to determine the effects of demographic profiles on cybercrime awareness and 
reporting.  
 
The last limitation was that this was a cross sectional study; therefore, future studies could 
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8.7 Conclusion 
This research proposed a framework which presents the essential features that are needed for 
users of ICT in public organisations in Botswana to be able to report cybercrime incidents or 
attacks that they experience. This was achieved after collecting data and empirically 
analysing it; thereby three elements (Cybercrime Awareness, User Training on Information 
Security Awareness, and Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation) were found to have 
statistically significant impact on the ability of users’ Reporting of Cybercrime incidents that 
they experienced. Furthermore, Organisational Culture and User Training on Information 
Security Awareness were also found to be statistically significantly impacting on Cybercrime 
Awareness in the Botswana public sector.  
 
This study expands on the body of knowledge that is currently available on the impact of an 
increase in ICT investment by governments especially in Africa and other developing 
nations, which results in problems such as cybercrime; hence the study contributes by 
suggesting a solution to deal with this problem. Finally, it is anticipated that results of this 
study will motivate other scholars to expand on the issue of cybercrime reporting in other 
sectors and countries that have invested on ICT to enhance their operations and improve 
efficiency. These research findings can also be implemented by the Botswana Government to 
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Appendix A: Cover Letter 
_____________________________________ 
Department of Information Systems 
Leslie Commerce Building 
Engineering Mall. Upper Campus 
OR Private Bag. Rondebosch 77001 
Cape Town 
Tel: 650-2261 
Fax No: (021) 650-2280 
 
 
Dear Sir / Madam 
 
Questionnaire on Cybercrime Awareness and Reporting in the Public Sector in Botswana 
 
I am an Information Systems Masters student at the University of Cape Town (UCT) conducting research 
on factors that inhibit cybercrime awareness and reporting in the Botswana public sector.  The attached 
questionnaire is aimed at the IT, Human Resources or Administration departments, Senior Management 
and General Computer Users. Factors that contribute to poor cybercrime awareness and reporting have 
been identified and presented in the questionnaire.  
 
This questionnaire focuses on organisational culture, human behaviour, incident management, user 
training on information security awareness and lastly understanding information security regulations 
within your organisation. The main aim is to gain an understanding into how your organisation deals with 
these issues.  
 
You are kindly requested to participate in this research by completing the attached questionnaire. The 
results of this study can be made available to participants on request. The information that is collected 
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Appendix B: Research Permit  
Telephone: (267) 363200 
FAX (267) 353100 . 
TELEGRAMS:RABONGAKA 
TELEX: 2818 CARE BD 
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA 
REF NO: PPME-13/18/1 Vol VII (98) 
Sinka Matengu 
P.O. Box 3 
Kasane 
Dear Mr Matengu 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
PRIVATE BAG 0038 
GABORONE 
13 September 20 II 
EXEMPTION: CYBERCRIME AWARENESS AND REPORTING IN THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR IN BOTSWANA 
Reference is made to your application dated 12 September 2011 submitted to the Health 
Research Unit (HRU) for permission to conduct Cybercrime Awareness and Reporting 
in the Public Sector in Botswana. The HRU granted permission as the study poses no 
more than minimal risk and is therefore categorized as exempt research. 
Permission is therefore granted to conduct the above mentioned study.. This 
approval is valid for a period of 1 year effective 13 September 2011. 
This permit does not however grant you authority to collect data from the selected 
organizations without prior approval from their management. Consent from identifiable 
individuals should be obtained. 
Furthermore, you are requested to submit a copy of the report or publication from this 
activity to the Health Research Division as part of dissemination of findings for our data 
base and library. 
Yours sincerely 
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Appendix C: Questionnaire 
Research Questionnaire: Cybercrime Awareness and Reporting in the Public Sector in Botswana 
 
Instructions: Please answer the following questions in relation to your organisation regarding cybercrime or 




Ministry  Name:  Department: Gender: (tick) Age: (tick age group) 
  Male  Female  21-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
Nationality:         
   
 
Awareness  











1 I understand what cybercrime is 1 2 3 4 5 
2 I can identify cybercrime incidents/attacks 1 2 3 4 5 
3 I know how to protect myself from cybercrime 1 2 3 4 5 
4 I understand the impact of cybercrime to my 
organisation 
















5 I know about the cybercrime law of Botswana 
(Cybercrime & Computer Related Crimes Act) 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 I know the contents of the cybercrime law of 
Botswana 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 My organisation makes its employees aware of 
the cybercrime law 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 I know that the cybercrime law is helpful to 
address cybercrime in my organisation 




9 My organisation makes it easy for the staff 
members to report any issues of concern 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 My organisation mostly informs all employees 
about critical or important information 
1 2 3 4 5 
11 Employees are free to report their issues of 
concern to anyone regardless of position in the 
organisation 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 My organisation provides general induction 
(training) to new employees 
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13 Employees normally share information on critical 
issues in my organisation  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Information Security Training 
 











14 My organisation has an information security 
awareness training programme 
1 2 3 4 5 
15 IT officers in my organisation are trained on how 
to respond to information security matters 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 My organisation provides ongoing refresher 
courses/training on information security 
1 2 3 4 5 
17 Training on information security awareness is 
important for my organisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
18 Most employees (who use computers) in my 
organisation have received information security 
awareness training 




19 I always report cybercrime incidents that I 
experience 
1 2 3 4 5 
20 I know where to report cybercrime incidents in 
my organisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
21 The IT department/unit in my organisation 
understands what to do about reported 
cybercrime incidents 
1 2 3 4 5 
22 I think most cybercrime incidents are reported in 
my organisation 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
23 I know that it is important to report cybercrime 
incidents in my organisation  
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Appendix D: Questionnaire Items Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Descriptive Statistics  
  Valid N Mean Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. 
AWARE1 54 1.814815 1.000000 5.000000 0.870352 
AWARE2 54 1.592593 1.000000 4.000000 0.630020 
AWARE3 54 1.574074 1.000000 3.000000 0.601942 
AWARE4 54 1.611111 1.000000 3.000000 0.596109 
LEGIS1 54 1.592593 1.000000 4.000000 0.714236 
LEGIS2 54 1.388889 1.000000 2.000000 0.492076 
LEGIS3 54 1.481481 1.000000 4.000000 0.693385 
LEGIS4 54 1.444444 1.000000 3.000000 0.537874 
CULTR1 54 2.481481 1.000000 4.000000 0.693385 
CULTR2 54 2.425926 1.000000 3.000000 0.569735 
CULTR3 54 4.129630 3.000000 5.000000 0.753515 
CULTR4 54 3.814815 1.000000 5.000000 0.802686 
CULTR5 54 3.407407 1.000000 5.000000 1.173907 
TRAIN1 54 1.500000 1.000000 4.000000 0.606568 
TRAIN2 54 1.407407 1.000000 2.000000 0.495966 
TRAIN3 54 1.407407 1.000000 3.000000 0.532652 
TRAIN4 54 1.537037 1.000000 5.000000 0.770027 
TRAIN5 54 1.574074 1.000000 3.000000 0.632511 
REPOT1 54 1.388889 1.000000 3.000000 0.596109 
REPOT2 54 1.462963 1.000000 4.000000 0.719354 
REPOT3 54 1.500000 1.000000 5.000000 0.795032 
REPOT4 54 1.500000 1.000000 3.000000 0.574620 
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Appendix E: Factor Analysis (0.55 value & 5 factors) 
Showing all items 
  
Factor Loadings (Varimax normalized)  
Extraction: Principal components 
(Marked loadings are >.550000) 
 Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
AWARE1 -0.008678 0.842051 0.074911 0.257815 -0.005544 
AWARE2 0.145255 0.863327 -0.001517 -0.110352 0.023135 
AWARE3 -0.059521 0.769254 0.105322 -0.019758 0.046728 
AWARE4 0.158326 0.680171 -0.000829 -0.035861 0.023754 
LEGIS1 0.008674 -0.082097 0.819750 0.178395 -0.124836 
LEGIS2 -0.078436 0.181238 0.695558 0.130474 0.084924 
LEGIS3 0.109304 0.022795 0.783965 0.130144 -0.118895 
LEGIS4 -0.089738 0.065868 0.839818 -0.014977 0.102297 
CULTR1 0.177348 0.280073 0.279051 -0.071051 0.247552 
CULTR2 -0.026051 0.347787 0.112436 -0.063154 0.615359 
CULTR3 0.036489 -0.044116 0.046769 0.113937 0.809004 
CULTR4 -0.062990 0.115334 -0.019285 -0.055725 0.785897 
CULTR5 -0.018215 0.179117 0.144719 -0.107223 -0.503267 
TRAIN1 0.443997 -0.040387 0.038434 0.791371 0.081937 
TRAIN2 -0.019607 0.027548 0.167875 0.832947 0.004772 
TRAIN3 0.116729 0.028427 0.195533 0.867555 0.052054 
TRAIN4 0.044757 -0.031753 0.028850 0.701890 0.016718 
TRAIN5 0.511691 0.075960 -0.080175 0.549930 -0.013455 
REPOT1 0.831764 0.158219 0.018602 0.274030 0.027785 
REPOT2 0.795239 0.275213 -0.161277 0.162203 0.048307 
REPOT3 0.701893 0.016268 0.325791 -0.071687 -0.134699 
REPOT4 0.566906 -0.378850 0.367662 -0.128479 0.050601 
REPOT5 0.607170 0.003331 -0.201541 0.174649 0.011903 
 
 
Appendix F: Construct Item Analysis 
Cybercrime Awareness (AWARENESS) 
Summary for scale: Mean=7.03704 Std.Dv.=2.14531 Valid N:54  
Cronbach alpha: .825185 Standardized alpha: .833992 












AWARE1 5.092593 2.046982 1.430728 0.721607 0.765455 
AWARE2 5.314815 2.623114 1.619603 0.807790 0.714995 
AWARE3 5.351852 3.042867 1.744382 0.575326 0.812465 














Understanding of Cybercrime Legislation (LEGISLATION) 
Summary for scale: Mean=6.05556 Std.Dv.=2.06879 Valid N:54  
Cronbach alpha: .827061 Standardized alpha: .829945 












LEGIS1 4.407407 2.130316 1.459560 0.731365 0.746136 
LEGIS2 4.666667 2.925926 1.710534 0.557720 0.823136 
LEGIS3 4.555555 2.358025 1.535586 0.649323 0.785777 
LEGIS4 4.537037 2.581962 1.606848 0.708186 0.761456 
 
 
Organisational Culture (O_CULTURE) 
 
Showing only 4 Items (CULTR5 deleted) 
Summary for scale: Mean=9.01852 Std.Dv.=1.89827 Valid N:54  
Cronbach alpha: .627040 Standardized alpha: .639187 












CULTR1 6.518518 2.545954 1.595604 0.263898 0.652613 
CULTR2 6.555555 2.506173 1.583090 0.495264 0.527504 
CULTR3 7.148148 2.126200 1.458150 0.391920 0.571452 




User Training on Information Security Awareness (TRAINING) 
Summary for scale: Mean=7.20370 Std.Dv.=2.35828 Valid N:54  
Cronbach alpha: .838569 Standardized alpha: .853297 












TRAIN1 5.740741 3.340192 1.827619 0.802141 0.759754 
TRAIN2 5.814815 3.965706 1.991408 0.646443 0.809178 
TRAIN3 5.870370 3.668381 1.915302 0.784878 0.774547 
TRAIN4 5.740741 3.414266 1.847773 0.549599 0.844516 
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Cybercrime Reporting (REPORTING)  
Summary for scale: Mean=7.22222 Std.Dv.=2.35257 Valid N:54  
Cronbach alpha: .764836 Standardized alpha: .765463 












REPOT1 5.833333 3.435185 1.853425 0.752878 0.650361 
REPOT2 5.759259 3.256859 1.804677 0.648208 0.678109 
REPOT3 5.722222 3.274691 1.809611 0.539192 0.727476 
REPOT4 5.722222 4.237654 2.058556 0.371355 0.771924 
REPOT5 5.851852 4.200274 2.049457 0.406915 0.761594 
 
 
